NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Volume 98

Number 6

Article 4

9-1-2020

The Guardian Trustee in Bankruptcy Courts and Beyond
Lindsey D. Simon

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Lindsey D. Simon, The Guardian Trustee in Bankruptcy Courts and Beyond, 98 N.C. L. REV. 1297 (2019).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol98/iss6/4

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been
accepted for inclusion in North Carolina Law Review by an authorized editor of Carolina Law Scholarship
Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.

98 N.C. L. REV. 1297 (2020)

THE GUARDIAN TRUSTEE IN BANKRUPTCY
COURTS AND BEYOND *
LINDSEY D. SIMON **
Litigation systems create dangers of unfairness. Citizens worry, and should
worry, about exploitive settlements in aggregate litigation, potential biases in
administrative proceedings, and troubling power imbalances in criminal trials.
Public confidence in adjudicative processes has eroded to an all-time low. This
Article explores the untapped potential of adding independent watchdog entities
to address systemic threats to the integrity of government decisionmaking. These
entities, which I call “guardian trustees,” do not fit within the traditional
framework of our adversary system. Though guardian trustees already operate
in bankruptcy proceedings, they have thus far received little attention in
scholarly literature. This Article begins the work of highlighting the contributions
of these entities and their promise for restoring confidence in at-risk systems.
In bankruptcy, the United States Trustee serves as an independent guardian
trustee of systemic integrity. Congress created the U.S. Trustee Program in
response to waning trust in the early bankruptcy system. Building upon the
example of the U.S. Trustee, this Article identifies the qualities of effective
guardian trustees, and addresses questions relating to their design and powers.
It then highlights, as a general matter, elements of systems that may merit
incorporation of a guardian trustee, and introduces aggregate litigation as an
ideal environment to deploy the concept. Finally, this Article identifies
additional situations that could benefit from the creation of a guardian trustee,
including administrative agency enforcement and the problems raised by plea
bargains and prosecutorial misconduct in the criminal process. In part by
identifying and addressing potential pitfalls of expanding the guardian trustee
concept and outlining a path to implementation, this Article sets the stage for the
American legal system to employ the guardian trustee.
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INTRODUCTION
For as long as legal systems have existed, parties have found ways to work
around governing rules. Some judicial systems are structured in ways that
effectively combat this threat, but others remain at risk. Aggregate litigation
systems, which center on class action lawsuits and multidistrict adjudication, are
particularly susceptible to abuse. 1 In this context, dangers of collusion,
manipulation, and evasion combine to erode both the integrity of the system
and public trust in it. Past efforts have failed to remedy these problems. Other
analysts have proposed ameliorative interventions, such as increasing resources
or incentivizing objectors. 2 These suggestions, however, hold little promise of
complete success. Thus, this Article offers a new and previously unexplored idea
for improving aggregate litigation and other key forms of dispute resolution:
the guardian trustee.
This Article defines a “third-party trustee” as an entity in litigation that is
neither the arbiter nor a party. 3 Third-party trustees already operate in some
corners of the law. The vast majority are “representative” trustees, designed to
advocate on behalf of stakeholders or viewpoints that are not yet represented
within a case or proceeding. Some examples include an intervenor in class
actions, a guardian ad litem in family law proceedings, and the patient care
ombudsman in bankruptcy. 4 In contrast, a “guardian” trustee, which is the focal
point of this Article, does not represent an absent party or interest in a case, but
instead exists to guard the integrity of the decisionmaking system itself.
Bankruptcy law provides the quintessential example, in the form of the U.S.
Trustee. 5 The U.S Trustee has no client, but instead looks out for the interests
of all stakeholders in the bankruptcy process. The U.S. Trustee is not motivated
1. See infra Section III.B.
2. See infra Section III.C.
3. The traditional litigation framework involves parties bringing a dispute and an arbiter charged
with deciding it. Sometimes, however, this standard balance is joined by a third presence. A “thirdparty trustee” in litigation is an additional entity in a case that is not a party but also has no connection
to the arbiter.
4. See infra Section III.C.1.
5. Throughout this Article, the abbreviation “U.S. Trustee” means the Acting United States
Trustee and its individual representatives and agents that may appear in each case, the “Program”
means the nationwide United States Trustee Program, and the “Office” refers to an individual Office
of the United States Trustee. For background, the overall system is called the “U.S. Trustee Program.”
Each of the twenty-one regions within the Program has an Acting U.S. Trustee who oversees one or
more Offices. See United States Trustee Program, About the Program, U.S. DEP’T JUST.,
https://www.justice.gov/ust/about-program [https://perma.cc/URK5-E3RN] (last updated Dec. 6,
2019). Each Office has a team that may include an Assistant U.S. Trustee, trial attorneys, bankruptcy
analysts, paralegals, and others. See id. Note that there is a critical distinction between the U.S. Trustee
and other forms of private trustees, such as the Chapter 7 trustee, which is appointed to stand in and
act on behalf of the debtor in the context of a Chapter 7 case. Although the Program oversees a panel
of standing trustees that may be appointed in this context, the role of private trustees is distinct from
the U.S. Trustee and beyond the scope of this Article.
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by specific outcomes or incentivized by money; rather, its purpose is to oversee
compliance with the U.S. Bankruptcy Code and to ensure that business
restructurings do not fall victim to abuse. 6 The U.S. Trustee does not answer
to the bankruptcy judge; rather, it is designed to operate independently of the
court and the parties before it. 7 Although representative trustees represent
absent interests in a way that may also protect the integrity of a system, they
are fundamentally different from guardian trustees, which purposefully act to
prevent systemic abuse for all stakeholders, including the general public. 8
Guardian trustees offer a viable solution only if they are effectively
designed and carefully deployed. The entity must have sufficient powers and
insulation from influence to remain neutral and provide a useful check. The
requisite process must include standing to appear and be heard, and the ability
to collect critical information. Neutrality is ensured by shielding the guardian
trustee from financial leverage and other pressures that participants in the
controversy might exert. Careful attention must be paid to how the guardian
trustee is designed, so as to avoid principal-agent issues and separation-ofpowers concerns. Congress utilized pilot programs to create the Program, and
similar pilot programs could promote a positive introduction for other guardian
trustees. 9
Any effort to employ the guardian trustee in settings beyond bankruptcy
should take account of the distinct problems of the “at-risk” systems that
warrant such a guardian’s use. In particular, the use of a guardian trustee holds
out the greatest promise of success when (1) there is a likelihood that the parties’
interests will align in a way that circumvents the system’s overarching goals,
rules, and procedures; (2) the court (or other decisionmaker) has insufficient
access to information about the potential problems that prevent it from serving
as an effective check on self-interested parties; (3) the system has built-in
weaknesses that render it subject to abuse; and (4) public concern about the
basic fairness of the system has been stretched to a breaking point. When
evaluating such decisionmaking systems—including those that involve
aggregate litigation, agency enforcement, and criminal law proceedings—
policymakers should not overlook the option of incorporating into them an

6. Id.
7. One could raise valid arguments that the U.S. Trustee is beholden to the executive branch in
a way that counteracts the perception of independence. See infra Section I.D. However, this
shortcoming is avoidable with adjustments to where it is structured. See infra Section I.D.
8. To be clear, I do not advocate for abandoning representative trustees or wholly replacing them
with guardian trustees. Instead, I suggest that guardian trustees be considered among the viable
possibilities when lawmakers and commentators evaluate approaches to remedy systemic integrity
threats.
9. See infra notes 23–24 and accompanying text.
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unbiased and independent entity dedicated to advancing the concerns of all
those involved. 10
In aggregate litigation, for example, all of the risk factors identified here
combine to negatively impact public trust in the system. Counsel for both the
plaintiffs and the defendants may share an interest in the pursuit of fees and
settlement. 11 The court has oversight authority, but relies upon the parties to
bring problems to its attention, while also facing resource challenges. 12 Flexible
review standards allow the parties to evade challenges, and public confidence in
aggregate litigation is not high. 13 Creating an independent trustee to oversee
problematic parts of the aggregate litigation process, such as an “Aggregate
Settlement Guardian” to evaluate class action settlements, could address these
problems and improve the quality of final results. Scholars have previously
highlighted the comparison between bankruptcy and aggregate litigation,
suggesting that bankruptcy may provide a useful model for improving
challenges of the aggregate litigation process (including the presence of the U.S.
Trustee as a “monitor”). 14 Missing from the conversation until now, however,
is a full analysis of the role that guardian trustees like the U.S. Trustee play and
the benefits that such entities could bring beyond the bankruptcy context.
Some observers may question why a guardian trustee, with its inherent
costs, offers a superior solution to alternatives. To be sure, in many situations,
concerns regarding integrity could be reduced by creating additional
representative trustees or dedicating more resources to the affected
decisionmaker. But these measures will not always work well, particularly where
a combination of factors has led to the decay of public trust in the process. Use
of the guardian trustee should be limited, both in the scope of its role and the
circumstances in which it is deployed. In some contexts, however, the guardian
trustee may drastically improve the operation of at-risk systems.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I explores historical challenges
within the bankruptcy system that led to the creation of the U.S. Trustee and
explores the use of that entity in modern bankruptcy proceedings. Part II offers
10. In some circumstances, the inherent problems in a system may only be remedied by legislative
or regulatory action. The guardian trustee is not a replacement for Congress’s role to reshape and refine
legal systems. To the contrary, in many cases the addition of a guardian trustee will highlight the need
for legislative revision by influencing the system to function according to its design. Only after a
system’s rules and procedures are actually being followed can commentators and legislators accurately
evaluate whether those rules and procedures are effective.
11. See infra Section III.B.
12. Supplementing a court’s resources, for example by increasing reliance on special masters,
could address some (but not all) of these concerns. See infra Section III.C.2.
13. See infra Section III.B.
14. See, e.g., Troy A. McKenzie, Toward a Bankruptcy Model for Nonclass Aggregate Litigation, 87
N.Y.U. L. REV. 960, 999–1000, 1018 (2012) [hereinafter McKenzie, Bankruptcy Model] (“The
institutions of bankruptcy—committees representing various groups and a monitor (the U.S.
Trustee)—counterbalance the limited power of dispersed and potentially unsophisticated claimants.”).

98 N.C. L. REV. 1297 (2020)

1302

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 98

a blueprint for designing a guardian trustee by identifying the key components
that make these entities work well. Part III explores the circumstances that
invite use of a guardian trustee, specifically by demonstrating aggregate
litigation as a paradigm case in which this overlay on the decisionmaking process
offers many advantages. Part IV identifies additional opportunities to expand
the use of the guardian trustee, including in the administrative and criminal law
contexts.
I. WATCHDOGGING THE BANKRUPTCY PROCESS
The U.S. bankruptcy system offers relief to struggling businesses and
consumers while providing stability and structure to frustrated creditors.
Bankruptcy replaces a chaotic alternative and is a fundamental pillar of the
modern American economy. The U.S. Trustee is one feature of the bankruptcy
process, and its development provides a useful example of the guardian trustee
concept and how it can support a critical system. This part introduces the U.S.
Trustee by describing the historical context that necessitated its creation. It then
explores the various administrative and guardian functions that Congress
designed for the U.S. Trustee, and identifies the Program’s structural
orientation within the government. Finally, this part describes the reception to
the U.S. Trustee over time and the ways that the U.S. Trustee impacts
behaviors and outcomes in bankruptcy cases.
A.

Bankruptcy as an At-Risk System

The Program began as an experiment in reforming a bankruptcy system
in distress. Prior to the U.S. Trustee pilot program, which was created as part
of the comprehensive modernization of the Bankruptcy Code in 1978, 15 the
restructuring process encountered two main problems.
First, two core elements of the modern bankruptcy process—the “debtor
in possession” and absent-party committees—were all but eliminated due to
changes made by the Chandler Act in 1938. 16 Instead of permitting private
groups to collectively negotiate their interests to reach a resolution in
bankruptcy, the Chandler Act directed the Securities and Exchange
Commission (“SEC”) to oversee all business bankruptcies involving firms that

15. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified as amended at
11 U.S.C. § 101 (2018)).
16. Pub. L. No. 75-695, 52 Stat. 840 (repealed 1978); see also Troy A. McKenzie, “Helpless” Groups,
81 FORDHAM L. REV. 3213, 3220–21 (2013) [hereinafter McKenzie, Helpless] (describing committees
in bankruptcy). In modern Chapter 11 cases, the debtor company retains control of its operations rather
than turning them over to a trustee, meaning it is a debtor “in possession” of the estate. See ELIZABETH
WARREN ET AL., THE LAW OF DEBTORS AND CREDITORS: TEXT, CASES, AND PROBLEMS 366
(Erwin Chemerinsky et al. eds., 7th ed. 2014).
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had issued publicly held securities. 17 Unlike the modern Program, the SEC
replaced committees of stakeholders and was vested with significant authority
to direct case reporting on any proposed plan of reorganization. 18 This reform,
however, proved to be a complete failure, 19 in part because the “SEC lacked the
resources to perform its assigned tasks in bankruptcy cases because of restrictive
budgets.” 20 As a result, bankruptcy cases languished, and parties turned to
alternative tools for dealing with insolvent businesses.
Second, bankruptcy judges (or referees, as they were previously called)
were overburdened by a combination of administrative and judicial functions. 21
The overlap of these functions fostered distrust in the integrity of the system.
The referee and parties to the litigation closely interacted on many elements of
each case in ways that often created a perception of favoritism and preferential
treatment for certain stakeholders. 22 In response to these difficulties, Congress
implemented a pilot program in eighteen judicial districts that removed the
administrative roles of referees and created the Program. 23 This program was
successful, and Congress extended it to all bankruptcy courts in 1986. 24

17. McKenzie, Helpless, supra note 16, at 3221.
18. § 173, 52 Stat. at 891.
19. Though the role of the SEC did not successfully improve the bankruptcy process due to the
combination of structural changes that accompanied its rise to power and the shortage of resources it
held, the idea that an independent agency could add legitimacy to the bankruptcy process survived in
creation of the Program.
20. McKenzie, Helpless, supra note 16, at 3225.
21. See Harvey R. Miller, The Changing Face of Chapter 11: A Reemergence of the Bankruptcy Judge as
Producer, Director, and Sometimes Star of the Reorganization Passion Play, 69 AM. BANKR. L.J. 431, 435–
40 (1995).
22. In re Schollett, 980 F.2d 639, 641 (10th Cir. 1992) (citing H.R. REP. NO. 99-764, at 17–18
(1986)).
23. H.R. REP. NO. 99-764, at 17; see also Rafael I. Pardo & Kathryn A. Watts, The Structural
Exceptionalism of Bankruptcy Administration, 60 UCLA L. REV. 384, 396 (2012) (discussing the six-year
pilot term of the Program).
24. Bankruptcy Judges, United States Trustees, and Family Farmer Bankruptcy Act of 1986, Pub.
L. No. 99-554, 100 Stat. 3088 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 581 note (2018)). Not all states
agreed to participate in the pilot program. Even after the 1986 Act permanently established the
Program nationwide, id., two states resisted its adoption. Despite pressure to join the Program, North
Carolina and Alabama remain without U.S. Trustees to this day. Each of these two states has a similar
institution, the U.S. Bankruptcy Administrator Program. See Daniel A. Austin, Bankruptcy and the Myth
of “Uniform Laws”, 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 1081, 1132–33 (2012) (describing distinctions between the
U.S. Trustee and Bankruptcy Administrator Program). In present form, Bankruptcy Administrators
share nearly identical powers with U.S. Trustees under the Bankruptcy Code. See, e.g., FED. R. BANKR.
P. 9035 (extending bankruptcy rules to the Bankruptcy Administrator Program). Key differences
between the two entities include a number of U.S. Trustee functions that are carried out by the court,
rather than a Bankruptcy Administrator. See Pardo & Watts, supra note 23, at 398 (noting the
distinctions between the two entities, most notably of which is that the Bankruptcy Administrator does
not select members of the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors). The creation of parallel
monitors, housed in different branches of government, provides a useful example of how structural
orientation can impact a trustee.
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The U.S. Trustee played an integral role in bringing the bankruptcy
system back from the brink of collapse. While many significant structural
revisions contributed to this result, the creation of the U.S. Trustee was a
central part of Congress’s successful effort to rebuild public trust in a system at
risk. 25 The next section describes the modern U.S. Trustee and the role it plays
within today’s bankruptcy system.
B.

Introducing the Guardian Trustee: The United States Trustee Program

Bankruptcy practitioners tend to take the Program and the role it plays in
the restructuring process for granted. By statute, a U.S. Trustee oversees each
bankruptcy case filed under Chapters 7, 11, 12, 13, and 15 of the Bankruptcy
Code, 26 and the U.S. Trustee’s delegated tasks are usually completed with little
controversy or notice. The significance of the U.S. Trustee, however, reaches
beyond the bankruptcy context because it illustrates how a neutral guardian can
be incorporated into a decisionmaking system in a way that greatly mitigates
abuses. This section introduces the U.S. Trustee and explores its history,
purpose, responsibility, and reception.
Understanding the U.S. Trustee requires a basic understanding of
bankruptcy. The debtor is the individual or corporation seeking debt
restructuring in bankruptcy. Each debtor has creditors to whom the debtor owes
money or performance. The creditors may have secured or unsecured status
depending on the nature of the debt. 27 A U.S. Trustee is automatically
appointed in most bankruptcies and is responsible for administrative tasks and
overseeing that the actions of all stakeholders comply with the Bankruptcy
Code. 28 If there is sufficient interest among unsecured creditors, the
Bankruptcy Code requires the U.S. Trustee to form a committee of unsecured
creditors to act on their behalf. 29 Even if a committee is formed, however,
unsecured creditors may still individually represent their interests in the
bankruptcy case. 30 The Bankruptcy Code provides that professionals
25. See, e.g., Peter C. Alexander, A Proposal To Abolish the Office of United States Trustee, 30 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 1, 4 (1996) (explaining that the U.S. Trustee permitted each bankruptcy judge to
“function as a neutral jurist”); Charles Jordan Tabb, The History of the Bankruptcy Laws in the United
States, 3 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 5, 35 (1995).
26. 28 U.S.C. § 586(a)(3) (2018).
27. WARREN ET AL., supra note 16, at 40–41.
28. See infra Section I.C (outlining in more detail the duties and obligations of the U.S. Trustee).
29. 11 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(1) (2018); see also Michelle M. Harner & Jamie Marincic, Behind Closed
Doors: The Influence of Creditors in Business Reorganizations, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1155, 1159 (2011)
(discussing the creditors’ committee and the role it serves).
30. After all, the committee represents the interests of all unsecured creditors, not just those of
an individual creditor (which may conflict with the committee’s position). See EDWARD L. SCHNITZER
& ANTING J. WANG, CREDITOR AND CREDITOR COMMITTEE CONFLICTS IN REPRESENTATION
(2010), https://hahnhessen.com/uploads/39/doc/2010_01_els_aw_creditorconflicts.pdf [https://perma
.cc/257Y-N8Z9].
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representing the committee will be paid by the debtor’s estate, 31 a program
feature designed to ensure that unsecured creditors (many of whom have claims
so small that the cost of a lawyer is not justified) can obtain meaningful
representation in the case. 32
Once a debtor files for bankruptcy, the Bankruptcy Code imposes an
automatic stay to halt all efforts to seek repayment from the debtor. 33 By
stopping creditors from racing to collect their debts from the dwindling (and
usually insufficient) funds of the debtor’s estate, the automatic stay provides
the debtor with time and a forum to negotiate with key constituencies; to decide
which of its ongoing contracts to keep in place or abandon; and (above all) to
develop an overarching strategy to exit bankruptcy, usually through liquidation,
sale to another owner, or reorganization. The court must approve the resolution
of a case, as well as any distributions of the estate’s assets to creditors.
The Bankruptcy Code imposes a priority scheme by which certain classes
of creditors must be paid in full before others may receive any payment. 34 If the
assets are insufficient to pay any class of creditors in full, each member of that
class receives a pro rata distribution. 35 Additional rules apply when the
proposed plan of reorganization is not consensual and is being “crammed down”
on dissenting creditors. The Bankruptcy Code requires that a Chapter 11 plan
be “fair and equitable,” which includes compliance with the absolute priority
rule. 36 This rule requires that no creditors in a class junior to the class of
dissenting creditors receive payment or retain estate property if the dissenting
class is not paid in full. 37 From the creditors’ perspective, the automatic stay
and priority rules prevent a disproportionate amount of assets from being
31. See Nancy B. Rapoport, Rethinking Professional Fees in Chapter 11 Cases, 5 J. BUS. & TECH. L.
263, 264–66 (2010) (describing professional fee allocation under the Bankruptcy Code and how it
influences the parties’ behavior).
32. Id. at 266.
33. 11 U.S.C. § 362 (2018).
34. Id. § 507 (outlining the obligation to pay administrative claims before priority unsecured
claims and then general unsecured claims). The Bankruptcy Code does not expressly state that secured
creditors receive payment first, but prioritization of secured debt is an undisputed core tenet of
bankruptcy law. Furthermore, although the Bankruptcy Code imposes a priority scheme, stakeholders
commonly take efforts to avoid or circumvent the limitations imposed by that scheme through various
creative measures. See Mark J. Roe & Frederick Tung, Breaking Bankruptcy Priority: How Rent-Seeking
Upends the Creditors’ Bargain, 99 VA. L. REV. 1235, 1246 (2013) (identifying instances of priority
jumping).
35. Pro rata distribution is not dictated by the Bankruptcy Code in Chapter 11 cases as it is in
Chapter 7 liquidations, see 11 U.S.C. § 726(b) (2018), but is so established in the bankruptcy process
that the principle is not challenged, see, e.g., Adam J. Levitin, Bankrupt Politics and the Politics of
Bankruptcy, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 1399, 1454 n.193 (2012) (explaining support behind the “equity is
equality” distribution norm in bankruptcy, including pro rata distribution).
36. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B) (2018).
37. Id.; see also Bruce A. Markell, Owners, Auctions, and Absolute Priority in Bankruptcy
Reorganizations, 44 STAN. L. REV. 69, 123 (1991) (describing the fundamental nature of the absolute
priority rule).

98 N.C. L. REV. 1297 (2020)

1306

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 98

distributed to the loudest, quickest, or most well-connected creditors. In this
way, the Bankruptcy Code imposes an orderly scheme for distribution within a
system that is rife with opportunities to act unfairly. 38
Once in bankruptcy, the debtor has significant reporting obligations, and
must publicly disclose its assets and debts, as well as information about its
operations if it is a corporation. Depending on the intended resolution of a case,
the debtor may file (1) motions to sell all or substantially all of its assets under
§ 363 of the Bankruptcy Code, (2) motions to approve a disclosure statement
and plan of reorganization, or (3) motions to wind down the company through
a liquidation plan, among others. 39 Throughout the life cycle of a bankruptcy
case, the parties may conduct discovery, challenge the propriety of the debtor’s
actions leading up to and during the bankruptcy, and pursue causes of action
related to the debtor’s estate in connected adversary proceedings before the
bankruptcy court. 40 Once the various issues are resolved, the restructuring is
completed, and the distributions (if any) are made to creditors, the court
dismisses the case and the debtor’s debts are discharged. The bankruptcy court
maintains jurisdiction to oversee later challenges relating to the parties’
obligations. 41
The U.S. Trustee is involved in every part of this process, and may
interact with and impact the action of every party involved in the proceeding. 42
Among other things, the U.S. Trustee reviews the debtor’s petition and
required disclosures, solicits and selects members of the creditors’ committee,
and ensures that all pleadings and actions in the case comply with the
Bankruptcy Code. Simply put, the U.S. Trustee is a fixture of the bankruptcy
process. It has tools that can alter the course of a case and has both the resources
and the institutional support to take the actions that it deems proper. Beyond
38. In almost all cases, unsecured creditors that receive any return on their debts will be given
less than a full recovery, or 100 cents on the dollar. The goal of the priority scheme is to ensure that
creditors of the same status are on a level playing field, for example returning a 10-cent recovery to all
unsecured creditors rather than 100 cents for 2 creditors and 1 cent for the rest. See David A. Skeel, Jr.,
The Empty Idea of “Equality of Creditors”, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 699, 706 (2018) (explaining the possibility
of favored treatment under prior versions of bankruptcy law then identifying instances where current
application of bankruptcy law may permit creditors to work around fundamental distribution
principles).
39. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 363(b)(1), 1123(a)(5)(D) (2018).
40. Adversary proceedings are akin to a civil case within a case. For example, creditors may litigate
allegations of fraudulent transfers, preferential prepetition payments, or other challenges against the
debtor, and the debtor may bring an adversary proceeding to raise claims that may not be raised within
the bankruptcy case itself but are related. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 7001; Douglas G. Baird & Edward
R. Morrison, Adversary Proceedings in Bankruptcy: A Sideshow, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 951, 953–54 (2005)
(outlining trends in adversary proceeding use and its role in consumer and corporate restructuring
cases).
41. This may include instances where the parties do not follow performance or payment
requirements of an approved sale or confirmed plan.
42. See infra Section I.C.
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the confines of the bankruptcy court, however, few have heard of the Program
and its role. When learning for the first time about the U.S. Trustee’s nearconstant presence in bankruptcy cases, many non-bankruptcy lawyers and
academics are surprised that it has standing to appear and be heard, that it does
not represent any specific party, and that it has existed for more than three
decades without generating controversy.
C.

Functions of the United States Trustee

Congress assigned various functions to the U.S. Trustee, many of which
are mundane and ministerial. However, the U.S. Trustee also has important
powers designed to permit it to safeguard the integrity of the bankruptcy
system. It is the U.S. Trustee’s distinctive guardian function that makes it a
valuable vehicle for exploring the notion—and the potential—of the guardian
trustee concept.
1. Administrative Functions
The U.S. Trustee is tasked with supervising the administration of
bankruptcy cases filed under Chapters 7, 11, 12, 13, and 15. 43 Among other
functions, the U.S. Trustee’s supervisory responsibilities include oversight of
professional compensation, 44 review of the debtor’s payment of mandatory
fees, 45 and evaluation of final reports in Chapter 7 cases. 46 The U.S. Trustee
must both oversee random audits of individual bankruptcies filed under
Chapters 7 and 13, and provide reports of relevant findings to the Attorney
General. 47 It is also responsible for selecting, appointing, and monitoring
private trustees who serve in all Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 cases, as well as in
select Chapter 11 cases. 48 The U.S. Trustee solicits and appoints the official
committee of unsecured creditors, a critical stakeholder in the bankruptcy
process. 49 Importantly, the U.S. Trustee’s handling of all these matters allows
the court to spend its time determining the merits of cases, rather than
administering them.
Although the U.S. Trustee role resembles, in some aspects, that of an
adjunct to the arbiter (such as a magistrate or special master), it is critical to
highlight differences as well. For example, the U.S. Trustee’s administrative

43. 28 U.S.C. § 586(a)(3) (2018).
44. Id. § 586(a)(3)(A), (I). Fees for certain bankruptcy professionals are paid out of the estate’s
assets, and detailed applications must be submitted to the U.S. Trustee and bankruptcy court for review
prior to approval. See 11 U.S.C. § 330.
45. 28 U.S.C. § 586(a)(3)(D).
46. 11 U.S.C. § 704(a)(9).
47. 28 U.S.C. § 586(a)(6).
48. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1302, 1104(d); 28 U.S.C. § 586(a)(1).
49. 28 U.S.C. § 586(a)(3)(E); 11 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(1).
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and information-gathering role is similar to that of a federal magistrate judge, 50
or a special master that oversees a particular issue within a broader dispute.
Magistrates and special masters, however, are adjuncts of the court and act as
the decisionmakers in making findings of facts and conclusions of law. Neither
of these characteristics applies to the U.S. Trustee, which has no power to rule
on any matter, but instead solely advocates for proper implementation of the
Bankruptcy Code.
2. Guardian Functions
Apart from shifting administrative tasks from bankruptcy judges to the
U.S. Trustee, Congress structured the entity to serve as a “watchdog” for the
bankruptcy process. The Program’s mission is “to promote the integrity and
efficiency of the bankruptcy system for the benefit of all stakeholders—debtors,
creditors, and the public.” 51 To effectuate that mission, “[t]he Program monitors
the conduct of bankruptcy parties and private estate trustees, oversees related
administrative functions, and acts to ensure compliance with applicable laws
and procedures.”52
In furtherance of its guardian role, the U.S. Trustee has powers that few,
if any, non-parties possess. Within a bankruptcy case, the strongest power
granted to the U.S. Trustee is its ability to appear and be heard on matters
relating to any issue in a case or proceeding under the Bankruptcy Code. 53 For
example, the U.S. Trustee often appears at the first-day hearing, an important
milestone at the beginning of a bankruptcy case that occurs within days of the
filing when many creditors do not yet know about the bankruptcy and the
creditors’ committee is not yet formed. 54 At this hearing, the U.S. Trustee often
challenges the debtor’s efforts to push for immediate relief on matters that could
impact the absent stakeholders. 55 Later, the U.S. Trustee conducts the § 341(a)
creditors’ meeting, at which all creditors may appear and ask the debtor
questions under oath. 56 Additionally, it can also call for further discovery, both

50. See 28 U.S.C. § 631 (2018); see also Philip M. Pro, United States Magistrate Judges: Present but
Unaccounted for, 16 NEV. L.J. 783, 807–11 (2016) (explaining the development, structural orientation,
and role of magistrate judges as judicial officers in the U.S. federal judicial system).
51. United States Trustee Program, Mission Statement, U.S. DEP’T JUST., https://www.justice.gov
/ust/strategic-plan-mission [https://perma.cc/W7BW-6B2H] (last updated May 8, 2015).
52. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES TRUSTEE POLICY AND PRACTICE MANUAL 8
(2015).
53. 11 U.S.C. § 307.
54. See WARREN ET. AL., supra note 16, at 373.
55. See generally Frederic J. Baker, The Rush to Judgment, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Mar. 1998
(describing the U.S. Trustee’s influence at the first-day hearing).
56. 11 U.S.C. § 341(a), (c).
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formally through a Rule 2004 examination, and informally via direct requests
for information. 57
To fulfill its guardian function, the U.S. Trustee monitors the progress of
each case and takes action to prevent undue delay. 58 The U.S. Trustee may
move to dismiss or convert cases that are improperly filed or managed; 59
monitor and comment on the debtor’s plan, disclosure statement, and other
filings; and object when these documents do not comply with the requirements
of the Bankruptcy Code. 60 The U.S. Trustee may also bring an adversary
proceeding to argue that the debtor’s discharge should be revoked or denied,
threatening the core relief offered by a restructuring. 61
Some of the U.S. Trustee’s powers that enable it to act as a guardian are
shared by federal agencies acting on behalf of the government. For example, the
Program occasionally implements interpretations of bankruptcy law through
the federal notice and comment rulemaking process. 62 The Program also assists
with federal enforcement efforts to combat bankruptcy fraud and crime through
coordination with the FBI and other law enforcement agencies. 63 At the same
time, the Program independently exercises the majority of its entrusted
responsibilities without influence from any branch of government. Beyond its
powers and obligations, the U.S. Trustee’s structural orientation within the
government shapes its role as guardian trustee.
D. Structural Orientation of the United States Trustee Program
One of the most noteworthy elements of the Program is the way it is
structured within the executive branch. The Department of Justice, through the
Attorney General, oversees the Executive Office of the United States Trustee,

57. In re Luxa, No. Bankr. 06-01543, 2007 WL 187982, at *2 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa, Jan. 22, 2007)
(concluding that informal discovery was inherent in the U.S. Trustee’s role “as the ‘watchdog’ of the
bankruptcy system” and pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 586 (2018)).
58. 28 U.S.C. § 586(a)(3)(G).
59. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b).
60. 28 U.S.C. § 586(a)(3)(B).
61. 11 U.S.C. § 727(c), (d).
62. See, e.g., Rules and Federal Register Notices, U.S. DEP’T JUST., https://www.justice.gov/ust
/rules-and-federal-register-notices [https://perma.cc/7WJU-5WAA] (last updated Aug. 7, 2017)
(listing final rules promulgated by the Program). The statutory source of the U.S. Trustee’s ability to
regulate ambiguities in the Bankruptcy Code is unclear, and courts and commentators alike have
questioned whether such regulations are entitled to the force and effect of law. See, e.g., In re Johnson,
106 B.R. 623, 624 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1989); Pardo & Watts, supra note 23, at 399 n.99.
63. 28 U.S.C. § 586(a)(3)(F).
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which in turn oversees each U.S. Trustee. 64 There are twenty-one regional U.S.
Trustee offices,65 and each Trustee is appointed for a five-year term. 66
While many assume that the U.S. Trustee is an adjunct of the courts—and
bankruptcy judges did previously handle many of the U.S. Trustee’s assigned
tasks 67—the Program is situated solely within the executive branch. The U.S.
Trustee differs from other specialists within the Justice Department because it
does not directly represent “the government” in bankruptcy cases. 68 In many
ways, the U.S. Trustee is a hybrid entity, taking on some quasi-judicial tasks,
such as reviewing petitions filed with the court for completeness or forming a
committee, and others that are quasi-executive, such as reporting suspected
bankruptcy fraud (which is a federal crime) to the Federal Bureau of
Investigation. 69
While on the one hand the U.S. Trustee is designed to be independent,
on the other having an arm of the executive branch serving as a watchdog for
bankruptcy cases is an oddity that cannot be overlooked. Setting aside the
benefits of having a centralized, nationwide pool of bankruptcy experts tasked
with the guardian role, 70 the system creates a fundamental separation-of-powers
tension—the executive may influence judicial procedures through a constant
presence in cases not involving the U.S. government. 71
Two states—Alabama and North Carolina—did not join the Program but
instead opted to create their own parallel system, the Bankruptcy Administrator

64. About the Program, U.S. DEP’T JUST., https://www.justice.gov/ust/about-program [https://
perma.cc/G6G4-ZG9X] (last updated Dec. 6, 2019).
65. Interestingly, the U.S. Trustee regions do not map onto the circuit boundaries of the U.S.
Court of Appeals. For example, Puerto Rico is in the First Circuit, yet its U.S. Trustees are from
Region 21 (which also includes Georgia and Florida, both part of the Eleventh Circuit). Compare FED.
JUDICIAL CTR., GEOGRAPHICAL BOUNDARIES OF U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS AND U.S. DISTRICT
COURTS (1999), https://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/2012/IJR00007.pdf [https://perma.cc/SCT9BDXY] (showing Puerto Rico in blue as part of the First Circuit while Georgia and Florida are in gray
as part of the Eleventh Circuit), with UST – Region 21, U.S. DEP’T JUST., https://www.justice.gov/ustregions-r21 [https://perma.cc/W7LE-NCVT] (listing Georgia, Florida, and Puerto Rico as part of U.S.
Trustee Region 21).
66. 28 U.S.C. § 581(b).
67. See supra text accompanying notes 21–24.
68. Despite the appearance of independence and connection with the judiciary, courts have found
that the U.S. Trustee’s committee appointments are subject to arbitrary and capricious review, the
standard normally applied to “an administrative agency in carrying out its administrative functions.”
See In re JNL Funding Corp., 438 B.R. 356, 362 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2010).
69. Courts interpreting the various privileges and immunities doctrines recognize the unique and
hybrid identity of the U.S. Trustee. See Balser v. Dep’t of Justice, 327 F.3d 903, 905, 910 (9th Cir.
2003) (extending both sovereign immunity, which applies to agencies of the United States, and judicial
immunity, which is reserved for courts, to the U.S. Trustee).
70. See infra Section II.A.1.d (discussing benefits of uniformity).
71. See infra text accompanying notes 111–18.
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Program. 72 In contrast to the U.S. Trustee, the Bankruptcy Administrator falls
under the control of the judicial branch—specifically the Administrative Office
of the United States Courts. 73 The judiciary exerts significantly more control
over the Bankruptcy Administrator, including its selection (by the circuit court
of appeals that oversees each respective district), which matters it addresses,
and the policy guidance it follows. 74 The Bankruptcy Administrator Program
itself has faced criticism, including challenges relating to its independence and
effectiveness. 75 Notwithstanding the potential merit of such arguments, the
Bankruptcy Administrator Program still offers a view into the possibility of
alternatively structuring the same guardian entity.
E.

Reception of the United States Trustee

Many who first learn of the Program are surprised by its unconventional
characteristics and broad powers. 76 The questions they raise often include:
“What do parties to a bankruptcy case make of the U.S. Trustee? And is the
Program accepted and respected?” Tucked within these questions is an intuitive
understanding that the U.S. Trustee’s watchdog function may be odd and
burdensome enough to draw objections.
The truth is that parties (and even courts) 77 often see the U.S. Trustee as
a valuable part of the bankruptcy system. Due to the U.S. Trustee’s access to
information from the debtor, it may well have insight into a case. Creditors may
call upon the U.S. Trustee to evaluate the direction or progress of the case, or
to identify a concern they have with a disclosure or a filing. An individual
creditor may not have sufficient resources to hire counsel to enter a notice of
appearance, draft and file an objection, or argue at a hearing. But the U.S.
Trustee has those resources, and is willing and able to pursue challenges. For
example, the U.S. Trustee has actively objected to the propriety of expansive

72. See, e.g., Peter C. Alexander & Kevin A. Hays, Non-Uniform Bankruptcy Laws After BAPCPA,
31 S. ILL. U. L.J. 549, 551–52 (2007). For further discussion of the bankruptcy administrator system,
see Pardo & Watts, supra note 23, at 394–97 (discussing the development of parallel U.S. Trustee and
Bankruptcy Administrator programs).
73. See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, BANKRUPTCY BASICS 20–21 n.5 (2011).
74. See Richard P. Carmody, Streamlining Administration in Bankruptcy, 4 AM. BANKR. INST. L.
REV. 502, 502 (1996) (noting differences between the Bankruptcy Administrator and U.S. Trustee
models).
75. See, e.g., Dan J. Schulman, The Constitution, Interest Groups, and the Requirements of Uniformity:
The United States Trustee and the Bankruptcy Administrator Programs, 74 NEB. L. REV. 91, 92–94 (1995)
(highlighting criticism relating to distinctions between the U.S. Trustee and Bankruptcy
Administrators).
76. Id. at 93–94.
77. See In re Parsley, 384 B.R. 138, 145, 147 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2008) (“But for the extremely
thorough investigation by the Office of the U.S. Trustee (UST), the Court may never have become
aware of the numerous other issues discussed herein. . . . The Court greatly respects the UST’s work
in this case and anticipates that the UST will participate in future hearings in this Court.”).
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third-party releases in Chapter 11 plans. 78 Such releases impact individual
creditors by preventing future recovery against released parties, yet the U.S.
Trustee is often the only objector. 79 Similarly, a creditors’ committee may be
hesitant to object to a problematic filing after it has reached a global settlement
with the debtor, especially if the deal requires the committee’s support
throughout the case. 80 At the request of just one creditor, however, the U.S.
Trustee can evaluate the objection and bring it before the court without
involving the committee at all. 81 The U.S. Trustee can also assist with interparty negotiation by offering independent judgment about the best approach
for addressing contested issues by way of compromise, thus eliminating the
need for hearings before the court. 82 In hallway meetings prior to and during
hearings, the U.S. Trustee will walk through its concerns, provide suggested
revisions, and address whether proposed edits to a plan are sufficient. This
negotiation occurs without requiring the court to delve into and decide
countless mundane nuances of a debtor’s case.
78. See Katherine A. McLendon & Lily Picon, The Changing Landscape of Consensual Third-Party
Releases in Chapter 11 Plans: Does Silence = Consent?, HARV. L. SCH. BANKR. ROUNDTABLE (May
7, 2018), http://blogs.harvard.edu/bankruptcyroundtable/files/2018/05/The-Changing-Landscape-ofConsensual-Third-Party-Releases-in-Chapter-11-Plans.pdf [https://perma.cc/N3WJ-274C] (noting
various cases where the U.S. Trustee objected to third-party releases).
79. Id.
80. It is not uncommon for a creditors’ committee to file objections and challenges to a debtor’s
actions, only to withdraw the objection on the eve of a large hearing once a settlement is reached. The
court and other stakeholders may never hear the full details of the challenge, and unless it is
subsequently raised by another party with standing, there will never be a decision about whether the
action was permissible. Counsel for the creditors’ committee may feel strongly that the challenge to an
action is meritorious, but when committee members decide that taking the best possible deal is in the
best interest of unsecured creditors, the merit of an objection fades in importance. Furthermore, after
the debtor settles with the committee, it is less likely that the committee will continue to challenge the
debtor’s proposed plan. The committee’s support of the plan or other path to reorganization is often a
condition of the debtor’s settlement with the committee. To the extent the committee is designed to
serve as a check on the debtor, the value of its check is diminished once a settlement has been reached.
See Ann K. Wooster, Annotation, Construction and Application of Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9019(a), Concerning
Judicial Approval of Compromise or Settlement in Bankruptcy Proceeding—Based on Paramount Interest of
Creditors, 35 A.L.R. FED. 2d 209, § 6 (2009).
81. See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, supra note 73, at 11.
82. While it may seem intuitive that informal negotiations with the U.S. Trustee can reduce costs,
those without exposure to the professional fee issues in the restructuring process may underestimate
the scope and impact of such costs. Under the Bankruptcy Code, professional fees for both the debtor
and the creditors’ committee (and sometimes other professionals) are paid by the estate in Chapter 11
cases. 11 U.S.C. §§ 326(a), 327(a) (2018). Unlike other areas of the law where clients bear the cost of—
and have an incentive to police—inefficiencies, in bankruptcy, many counsel bills are paid at 100 cents
on the dollar, all before the creditors get a single penny. When some large debtor cases have dozens of
attorneys, financial advisors, and other restructuring professionals, many billing in excess of $1000 per
hour, the impact of streamlining negotiations can result in significant savings to the estate. See, e.g.,
STEPHEN J. LUBBEN, ABI CHAPTER 11 PROFESSIONAL FEE STUDY xi (2007), https://ssrn.com
/abstract=1020477 [https://perma.cc/4KKT-KKU4] (evaluating the expense of professional fees in
Chapter 11 cases and noting that “requested fees are rarely reduced”); see also Rapoport, supra note 31,
at 263–65.
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To be sure, the Program is not universally revered. If one were to ask
bankruptcy practitioners who represent debtors, they might point to the hassle
of having to deal with the U.S. Trustee. 83 By nature of their role within a
bankruptcy, debtors bear the brunt of the U.S. Trustee’s focus, and may spend
large amounts of time complying with the U.S. Trustee’s demands for
additional information and modified pleadings. Creditors, too, may be
displeased with the burden involved in addressing the U.S. Trustee’s concerns.
The debtor, lenders, and creditors’ committee may all have agreed to a global
settlement, for example, only for the U.S. Trustee to throw a wrench in that
resolution by objecting to its particulars. 84 In those circumstances, every party
to the litigation would prefer that the U.S. Trustee not have the power to
intervene, as the parties would otherwise be able to resolve their dispute and
move on. And while cases in which the U.S. Trustee stands as the lone objector
are not rare, those are the very cases in which an independent voice, and
representative of the public interest, is most needed. Perhaps for this reason, in
the thirty years since Congress expanded the Program nationwide, there has
been no significant effort undertaken to remove the entity from bankruptcy
cases altogether. 85
The absence of backlash is potentially attributable to bankruptcy
practitioners’ acceptance of the role the U.S. Trustee serves. In any particular
case the U.S. Trustee may block a litigant’s desired path, but in the next case
the same litigant may be relieved that the U.S. Trustee raises an objection that
was too costly or risky for the litigant to raise himself. On balance, it seems that
the U.S. Trustee does enough good, and inflicts sufficiently minor harm, that
participants in the bankruptcy system embrace the Program. In the sort of “lone
83. See United States Trustee Program: Watch Dog or Attack Dog?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Commercial and Admin. Law & the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 2 (Oct. 2, 2007) (identifying
complaints about aggressive and unproductive demands from U.S. Trustees).
84. Such is the case in the context of the U.S. Trustees’ objection to structured dismissals. See
infra text accompanying notes 112–16; see also In re Buffet Partners, L.P., No. 14-30699, 2014 WL
3735804 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. July 23, 2014) (“[T]his court looks to the UST to raise issues to cause it to
stop and completely consider a matter even when no creditor objects.”). While it is far from certain
that a court will be persuaded by the U.S. Trustee’s objection when waged against the unified voice of
the parties, the cost and risk of an adverse ruling may alone be enough to push the parties to address
the source of the objection. See CLIFFORD J. WHITE III, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, WHY U.S. TRUSTEE
ENFORCEMENT SHOULD NOT YIELD TO DEBTOR AND CREDITOR PREFERENCES,
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/ust/legacy/2014/05/01/abi_201303.pdf
[https://perma.cc
/WN2R-5UK8] (identifying the U.S. Trustee’s obligation to fulfill its watchdog role, even when the
parties with “economic interests” are in agreement).
85. Because the Program is the most prominent example of an existing guardian trustee, it plays
a significant role in this Article to outline and develop the guardian trustee concept. To clarify, I do
not believe that the Program is a perfectly designed or implemented model of the guardian trustee.
Commentators have outlined a litany of concerns, challenges, and frustrations with the office and how
it operates, many of which are well founded. See, e.g., Carmody, supra note 74, at 502 (critiquing the
bureaucratic growth of the Program). But imperfections in the Program do not, alone, undermine the
promise of the guardian trustee device.
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objector” example above, certainly the U.S. Trustee earns the ire of the
constituents that want a quick and seamless resolution. However, as previously
noted, the very unanimity of parties may signal the need for a close look by the
U.S. Trustee. Follow-up action by the U.S. Trustee can, in turn, ensure that
the court is presented with all arguments, including ones relating to the “all-in”
parties’ circumvention of the Bankruptcy Code. 86 Indeed, as discussed in the
sections that follow, the guardian trustee’s independence is precisely what
permits it to operate as an effective watchdog of the bankruptcy process.
In turn, the U.S. Trustee exemplifies how a guardian trustee can operate
in the U.S. litigation system. 87 Perhaps due to the U.S. Trustee’s relative
obscurity, few efforts have been made to explore how the watchdog model
might be drawn upon in other settings. The next part focuses on how
policymakers might build on the U.S. Trustee model in an effort to improve
both civil and criminal decisionmaking processes.
II. DESIGNING THE GUARDIAN TRUSTEE
The preceding part presented the guardian trustee as a watchdog of at-risk
systems through the lens of bankruptcy and a focus on the U.S. Trustee. In later
parts, this Article will evaluate when a guardian trustee should be deployed and
identify specific instances where a newly created guardian trustee could
successfully mitigate structural integrity threats. 88 But effectively incorporating
guardian trustees into new environments first requires a thoughtful approach to
how a guardian trustee should function, how it should be structured, and what
86. Efficient circumvention of bankruptcy rules occurs when the party who would normally
challenge a particular action is offered enough money that it is worth it to the party to go along with
the course of action (even against its interests). For example, bankruptcy dockets reveal many instances
where the creditors’ committee raises an objection to the sufficiency of information in a disclosure
statement, but then immediately prior to a hearing will withdraw the objection after the debtor (or
lenders) throw a pot of money at the pool of general unsecured creditors. The information in a
disclosure statement is necessary for creditors to decide whether to vote in favor of a plan of
reorganization, and any deficiencies in that document may unfairly harm unsecured creditors, the
constituency the committee was created to represent. Even if the deficiencies remain, the members of
a committee often decide that the guaranteed courtesy payment is worth taking and withdraw their
objection.
87. Other similar entities can be found internationally, including the Israeli Official Receiver, the
Canadian Office of the Supervision of Bankruptcy (“OSB”), and the Master of the High Court in
South Africa. See Rafael Efrat, The Political Economy of Consumer Bankruptcy in Israel, in CONSUMER
BANKRUPTCY IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 167, 178–79 (Johanna Niemi-Kiesiläinen, Iain Ramsay &
William C. Whitford eds., 2003) (explaining that the Official Receiver has “become the dominant actor
in the Israeli bankruptcy scene”); Juanitta Calitz & Andre Boraine, The Role of the Master of the High
Court as Regulator in a Changing Liquidation Environment: A South African Perspective, 2005 J. S. AFR. L.
728, 730–32 (2005) (describing the powers and authority of masters in South Africa); Protecting
the Public, GOV’T CANADA, https://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/bsf-osb.nsf/eng/h_br03199.html [https:/
/perma.cc/DA3H-YU7A] (last modified Dec. 2, 2015) (outlining the role of the OSB, including
“intervening in court to protect the insolvency process”).
88. See infra Section III.B.
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powers it should hold. If any design element is poorly executed, the potential
benefits of a guardian trustee could be quickly outweighed by the various
challenges and costs associated with the trustee’s implementation.
In short, to embrace the guardian trustee, we must properly design it to
defend the integrity of the system it was created to guard. This part first
identifies core characteristics of effective guardian trustees and elements to
avoid, then addresses the structural orientation of a guardian trustee that best
furthers its purpose, and finally outlines a proposed scope of powers and
approach to implementation that creates an environment for success.
A.

Design Elements
1. Useful Characteristics

Assuming it is beneficial in a given circumstance to put in place a guardian
trustee, what are the characteristics and tools that position it to succeed at its
purpose? This question has no single answer, as each situation may require
modifications; however, certain core traits should be included when designing
a guardian trustee.
a.

Standing

The first characteristic of an effective guardian trustee is standing. 89 The
guardian trustee is not a party, but it must have the opportunity to appear and
be heard in the proceedings it monitors in order to serve its purpose. Without
standing, the watchdog is toothless, as its challenges can only be raised with
coordination of an existing party. 90 Because the guardian trustee may be the sole
objector against all other parties, it must have the capacity to raise its challenges
to discharge one of its core functions. 91 Standing should also extend to appeals,
which provide a check on both the parties as well as the decisionmaker through
judicial review.
b.

Discovery Powers

Guardian trustees must also have the ability to investigate and develop
facts about proceedings and the parties involved in them. One of the
89. A guardian trustee will not have standing in the strict constitutional sense. Instead, this
Article discusses standing more generally as a protected participatory role within a given proceeding
(or within the appeal thereof).
90. See William B. Rubenstein, The Fairness Hearing: Adversarial and Regulatory Approaches, 53
UCLA L. REV. 1435, 1449 (2006) (explaining the inability of private monitors to effectively voice
identified issues due to their lack of standing); see also Richard A. Nagareda, Turning From Tort to
Administration, 94 MICH. L. REV. 899, 951 (1996) (highlighting the need for individuals serving as
proposed checks at class action fairness hearings to be given “participatory rights,” akin to standing, to
be effective).
91. See Nagareda, supra note 90, at 951.
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characteristics that triggers consideration of a guardian trustee involves the
judges’, and perhaps the parties’, inability to adequately develop and identify
key facts. 92 A dearth of factual understanding leads to mistaken assumptions
and a failure to uncover abuses. If the guardian trustee can work only with
already-disclosed information, it is more likely that threats to fairness will go
unnoticed and the work of the guardian trustee will simply duplicate the work
of the judge. The increased cost involved in permitting an additional entity to
conduct discovery should be marginal; indeed, it will usually align closely with
the information sought by the adverse party. Presumably, each party is
interested in uncovering information about the underlying dispute and
confirming that the legal process is proceeding fairly. For various reasons,
including resource limitations and strategic considerations, the parties do not
always effectively uncover such facts. The guardian trustee would use discovery
to more effectively find this information.
c.

Independence

The guardian trustee must be independent from both the parties and the
decisionmaker. The U.S. Trustee is known for its independence from the
influence of other parts of the executive branch, and even its mission statement
identifies the “independent” quality of its efforts on behalf of all bankruptcy
stakeholders. 93 The value of this independence is best revealed when it is called
into question. In 2013, the Program came under scrutiny for using its discovery
powers in a bankruptcy case to obtain information allegedly on behalf of the
Consumer Financial Protection Board (“CFPB”). 94 Both the court and the
public reacted negatively to the U.S. Trustee’s perceived efforts. As one former
bankruptcy judge noted, “doing the bidding of another government agency
would be inconsistent with the mission of the U.S. Trustee’s role.” 95 The
legitimacy of a guardian trustee would be severely undermined if it were used
by other entities to gather information. As such, an effective guardian trustee
must maintain independence from influence and outside demands for
cooperation.
One common criticism of entities designed to check systemic abuses is that
their behavior is subject to influence, particularly in the form of financial

92. See Rapoport, supra note 31, at 286.
93. See Strategic Plan & Mission, U.S. DEP’T JUST., https://www.justice.gov/ust/strategic-planmission [https://perma.cc/LWL8-WK4H] (last updated May 8, 2015) (“The mission of the United
States Trustee Program is to promote the integrity and efficiency of the bankruptcy system for the
benefit of all stakeholders – debtors, creditors, and the public.”).
94. See Richard Pollock, CFPB Threatens Independence of Bankruptcy Office, WASH. EXAMINER
(Sept. 9, 2013, 12:00 AM), https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/cfpb-threatens-independence-ofbankruptcy-office [https://perma.cc/P3JN-7297].
95. Id.
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inducements. 96 Assuming an entity needs money to function, and that earning
more money will inure to the benefit of the entity’s representatives, the entity
will be influenced to make decisions that increase its financial gain (even if those
decisions deviate from the checks they were designed to provide). Financial
influence comes from varied sources and may include the parties (through the
prospect of settlement), the decisionmaker (through the award of fees 97), or
third parties that control the entity’s funding. 98
A guardian trustee should be fiscally independent, thereby avoiding the
influence of those holding the purse strings. The Program offers an excellent
example of how to design an entity that is sufficiently funded, while also
independent from the influence of money. Congress established a fund for the
Program, which generates money by automatically collecting court fees and
accruing investment interest. 99 Congressional appropriation from the fund
completely finances the operations of the Program. 100 Debtors, creditors, and
bankruptcy practitioners know that the payment of fees is the price of doing
business in bankruptcy. 101 Thus, the U.S. Trustee is never financially beholden
to others. Different deployments of a guardian trustee could adapt different
funding mechanisms, 102 but the core goal should be to ensure guaranteed
96. See Bruce L. Benson & John Baden, The Political Economy of Governmental Corruption: The
Logic of Underground Government, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 391, 397–98 (1985).
97. See Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Judging Multidistrict Litigation, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 71, 102–06
(2015) (describing the influence that multidistrict litigation transferee judges possess to approve,
reduce, and otherwise impact fee payments).
98. Rubenstein, supra note 90, at 1452 (noting the problematic influence of financial issues to
independent guardians).
99. 28 U.S.C. § 589a(b) (2018).
100. As an example, the Program requested more than $227 million for the 2020 fiscal year. See
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES TRUSTEE PROGRAM FY 2020 PERFORMANCE BUDGET
CONGRESSIONAL SUBMISSION 14, https://www.justice.gov/jmd/page/file/1144191/download [https://
perma.cc/QHW2-JCUQ]. From 1989 until 2016, the appropriation came directly from the United
States Trustee System Fund. In 2016, Congress shifted that structure to instead pull money from the
fund to the General Fund of the Treasury to the Program. Id. at 9. Currently, the issue of quarterly
fees is controversial due to a 2018 change in fee calculation that expanded potential costs for Chapter
11 debtors. See Bankruptcy Judgeship Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-72, 131 Stat. 1224; Justin Paget &
Nathan Krame, The Divide Between Courts on Ch. 11 Trustee Fees, LAW360 (April 23, 2020),
https://www.law360.com/articles/1266541/the-divide-between-courts-on-ch-11-trustee-fees [https://
perma.cc/87M5-4ZQ9] (describing ongoing legal challenges to the constitutionality of increased fees).
The current structure may change in light of these challenges.
101. Debtors pay a filing fee according to a statutory scheme. See Bankruptcy Court Miscellaneous Fee
Schedule, U.S. CTS., https://www.uscourts.gov/services-forms/fees/bankruptcy-court-miscellaneousfee-schedule [https://perma.cc/HV2R-9NA6]. Chapter 11 debtors also pay quarterly fees during the
duration of a bankruptcy case that range from $325 up to $250,000, based on the company’s
disbursements. See Chapter 11 Quarterly Fees, U.S. DEP’T JUST., https://www.justice.gov/ust/chapter11-quarterly-fees [https://perma.cc/CD72-6485].
102. For example, imposing different filing and quarterly fees in aggregate litigation makes
intuitive sense but may not be feasible (and may even be harmful) in the context of criminal
proceedings. This does not defeat the need for independence, but only requires additional innovation
to discover ways to best distribute the cost of a guardian trustee within the system it benefits.
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funding of sufficient resources to effectively oversee and evaluate both cases
and the actions of parties appearing therein.
d.

Uniformity

To be effective, a guardian trustee should take a uniform approach to the
task of maintaining system integrity, one that works to the benefit of all
stakeholders. This includes the selection of what issues to raise, how to pursue
challenges, and how to approach its work as a general matter. Not only does the
U.S. Constitution require such uniformity in administrating the bankruptcy
program, 103 but this uniformity is also necessary for protecting the legitimacy
of the trustee. In particular, if guardian trustees operate differently across
jurisdictions, parties are likely to engage in forum selection to avoid (or seek
out) the entity that best suits their needs. 104
Imposing a uniform approach will be more successful when the guardian
trustee is organized at a national, rather than local, level. For this reason, the
structural orientation of a guardian trustee within a system can greatly impact
how well it accomplishes the uniformity goal. If, for example, the Judicial
Conference of the United States oversees certain guardian trustees, it must be
careful how many decisions are delegated to the individual circuit or district to
avoid local differences.
2. Elements to Avoid
a.

Incentive Problems

The thoughtful design of a guardian trustee should avoid the influence of
financial incentives. A guardian trustee should be motivated to defend the
system, including the stakeholders that are at risk, when the rules and
procedures of the system are circumvented or ignored. The independence
required for the guardian trustee’s actions would be impossible if its funding
depended on outcomes. Entities that completely rely on the resolution of their
cases for funding are incentivized to pursue different approaches than those for
103. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 (explaining that Congress has the power to “establish . . .
uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States”). Prior to the passage of
several amendments standardizing the programs, nonuniform differences between Bankruptcy
Administrators and the U.S. Trustees led to a period of constitutional challenges and tension. See, e.g.,
St. Angelo v. Victoria Farms, Inc., 38 F.3d 1525, 1535 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that the disparity in
fees imposed under the U.S. Trustee system was unconstitutional); Schulman, supra note 75, at 92–94.
104. In many contexts, a litigant has the ability to choose where to file her claim. For example,
current venue rules permit a debtor company to file for bankruptcy where it is domiciled or has its
principal place of business, or the place where a debtor affiliate is able to file for bankruptcy. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1408 (2018). This is why General Motors, a company based in Detroit, was able to file in New York
where it has an affiliate dealership. See Bill Vlasic & Nick Bunkley, Obama Is Upbeat for G.M.’s Future,
N.Y. TIMES (June 1, 2009), https://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/02/business/02auto.html [https://
perma.cc/Z6TX-UGRL (dark archive)].
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whom money is no object. 105 On the other end of the spectrum, complete
independence from payments through the court system leads to entities that
must rely on donations, which may influence the amount of resources they have
to oversee a system or even influence which issues they decide to challenge. 106
Between those extremes lies a reasonable solution: automatic funding through
fees. As discussed above, the Program is self-funded through various fees from
bankruptcy cases and investment interest. 107 This money does not depend on
outcomes or shifting Congressional appropriation, but is instead generated by
the parties who benefit from the system.
b.

Agency Problems

Guardian trustees are, by design, not involved in a case to advocate for or
defend a particular interest or constituency. Their mission may align with one
party or another on a given issue, but above all they are guardians of the system.
While “defense of the system” makes sense in the abstract, in practice it is
important to clarify whether the guardian trustee actually does, or does not,
represent specific interests. Agency law concepts are best suited to assist with
this task because they provide a useful framework for discussing the authority
and influence that flow between two parties. By looking at potential principalagent relationships 108 of a guardian trustee and identifying which principals may
influence its decisionmaking in undesirable ways, it becomes possible to design
and structure the guardian trustee to avoid such influences.
First, a guardian trustee’s authority will be undermined if it is an agent of
the decisionmaker. If the parties perceive that the guardian trustee is aligned
with the court, they may act in an effort to garner favoritism or influence the
court through its agent. This was the case when the pre-1986 bankruptcy referee
carried out both judicial and administrative functions, which the parties
attempted to influence and which developed into a threat to the system’s
legitimacy. 109 There, the parties positioned themselves to curry favor with the
entity, thereby delegitimizing its independence. A guardian trustee should not
have the decisionmaker of the case as its principal. Although in many (and
hopefully all) instances both the arbiter and the guardian trustee would advocate
for the integrity of the system in which they operate, the arbiter may be subject
105. Rubenstein, supra note 90, at 1450 (describing the financial incentives of private objectors and
how those incentives “encourage them to pursue the least problematic settlements and to do so
gingerly”).
106. Id. at 1451.
107. 28 U.S.C. § 589a(b) (2018).
108. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW OF AGENCY § 1.01 (AM. LAW INST. 2006) (“Agency
is the fiduciary relationship that arises when one person (a ‘principal’) manifests assent to another
person (an ‘agent’) that the agent shall act on the principal’s behalf and subject to the principal’s control,
and the agent manifests or otherwise consents so to act.”).
109. See supra text accompanying notes 21–24.
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to other incentives or may itself have inferior access to information due to the
parties’ alignment on problematic issues.
Second, a guardian trustee loses effectiveness if it advocates for changes
to the system on behalf of its principal. When a guardian trustee becomes an
advocate for new rules, structures, or policies, it loses the neutral connotation
of its actions and the core of its role: protecting the existing system. If a
guardian trustee is the agent of the executive, the policy preferences of that
branch may influence its decisions and actions. To some degree such influence
seems reasonable, especially if the position falls within the bounds of existing
law and rules. But a strong principal may direct the guardian trustee to use its
powers to advocate for policy objectives beyond the current requirements of law
or statute.
To be sure, within any system there are elements that in practice may or
may not reflect what Congress intended, but which are technically legal until
either the statute is changed or binding precedent from the judicial branch
changes the status quo. However, before such changes occur, it is unclear
whether a guardian trustee would (or should) be motivated to challenge
undesirable elements. Stated another way, if the guardian trustee becomes an
advocate for changes to the system, it would likely be influenced to do so by its
principal and would no longer simply be guarding the integrity of the existing
system.
This concern has come into play with the Program. The Executive Office
of the United States Trustees may receive guidance from the Attorney
General’s office on specific issues or litigation positions. The U.S. Trustee may
then act upon those issues—for example, by filing an objection against a legal
action on the basis that it should not be legal, or advocating for a position on an
open question of law. 110 One recent instance of this principal-driven advocacy
was the U.S. Trustees’ position on structured dismissals prior to the issuance of
the Supreme Court’s opinion in Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corporation. 111 The
Jevic case strictly limited structured dismissals—a tool by which parties to a
bankruptcy negotiate and settle various claims, but then effectuate the terms of
that settlement by dismissing the case instead of attempting to confirm a plan
of reorganization. 112 One of the problems with a structured dismissal is that the
mandatory priority rules of the plan confirmation process do not expressly
110. The Program’s website touts its advocacy efforts and indicates coordination with the
Department of Justice to determine which issues to address. See Significant Pleadings and Briefs, U.S.
DEP’T JUST., https://www.justice.gov/ust/significant-pleadings-and-briefs [https://perma.cc/7QBMH7ZY] (last updated May 8, 2015) (listing cases and identifying “the legal positions taken by the U.S.
Trustee Program and the Department of Justice in areas that relate to new or novel issues under the
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 or long-standing areas of concern
to the Program”). Such actions give the appearance of influence by the U.S. Trustee’s principal.
111. 137 S. Ct. 973 (2017).
112. Id. at 979.
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apply. 113 As a result, parties, including those in Jevic, negotiate payments to key
constituencies that circumvent the priority scheme. 114 Leading up to the
decision in Jevic, the U.S. Trustee would object to any form of structured
dismissal, even those that honored the priority scheme. 115 The U.S. Trustee’s
perspective on issues, such as structured dismissals, may be valuable as courts
across the country evaluate and decide open questions of bankruptcy law. The
Program has sufficient expertise with current bankruptcy issues that it would
make a strong and learned advocate. And, to be clear, many practitioners and
scholars can agree with the positions they choose to advocate. 116 But whether an
entity can be effective or knowledgeable is separate and apart from whether the
entity should be taking advocacy positions at all. A guardian trustee should be
designed to avoid the influence of principals that would encourage it to advocate
for changes to the law. 117
B.

Structural Orientation

The next element to address when designing the guardian trustee is where
and how it should be oriented within existing systems. As discussed previously,
the situation of a guardian trustee can impact the perception of the trustee’s
independence, either from the arbiter or from another principal (such as the
executive branch). 118
For example, the Program could be subject to criticism relating to
separation-of-powers concerns. The judicial branch administers and oversees
113. Id. at 980 (“The Code does not explicitly state what priority rules—if any—apply to a
distribution in [a structured dismissal]”). Compare 11 U.S.C. §§ 1129(a)(7), (b)(2) (2018) (imposing the
absolute priority rule in a plan confirmation), with id. § 1112(b) (contemplating dismissal but not
mentioning the absolute priority rule).
114. Jevic, 137 S. Ct. at 981.
115. See, e.g., Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 1–2, Jevic, 137 S. Ct. 973 (No. 15649) (arguing against structured dismissals on behalf of the U.S. Trustees). The Supreme Court did
not extend its holding to all structured dismissals, but instead “express[ed] no view about the legality
of structured dismissals in general.” Jevic, 137 S. Ct. at 985. It remains unseen whether the U.S. Trustee
will continue its position of objecting to the structured dismissal in any form, but recent cases suggest
that even structured dismissals that comply with priority provisions may face challenges by the U.S.
Trustee. See Matt Chiappardi, U.S. Trustee Blasts Sungevity’s Structured Dismissal Bid, LAW360 (Aug. 4,
2017, 5:45 P.M.), https://www.law360.com/articles/951591/us-trustee-blasts-sungevity-s-structureddismissal-bid [https://perma.cc/SJQ5-X837 (dark archive)] (explaining the U.S. Trustee’s objection to
a proposed structured dismissal because it included releases that would be granted without approval of
creditors).
116. Brief for Amici Curiae Law Professors in Support of Petitioners at 12, Jevic, 137 S. Ct. 973
(No. 15-649) (supporting the U.S. Trustee’s position in Jevic).
117. Other avenues may exist for the U.S. Trustee to advance policy changes, for example by
collecting data on problematic issues that can be used to further their perspective in Congress or among
commentators. While such examples of “passive” advocacy may raise concerns about the independence
of a trustee, they are far less problematic than direct advocacy in the very case where a guardian trustee
appears.
118. See supra Section II.A.1.c.
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bankruptcy cases, and giving power to an executive branch trustee raises, at least
in perception, questions about whether the policies and preferences of the
executive are influencing what should otherwise be the trustee’s independent
function to ensure bankruptcy law compliance. 119 As the Bankruptcy
Administrator Program in Alabama and North Carolina makes clear, a guardian
trustee can be implemented effectively outside of the executive branch. 120 So
long as the guardian trustee is insulated from the influence of judges hearing
and deciding the cases in which the trustee appears, parties can avoid the
distrust felt toward the bankruptcy referee.
To best address concerns relating to separation of powers and influence by
the arbiter, it makes the most sense to create a guardian trustee through an
agency that operates within the same branch of government as the arbiter, just
like the example of bankruptcy administrators in the judicial branch. This
permits the guardian trustee to avoid separation-of-powers concerns that might
arise from outside influence from other branches of government. Next, the
guardian trustee must be insulated from the arbiter in a way that permits it to
act with true independence. Finally, any details relating to the guardian
trustee’s duties and powers should be implemented nationwide, without
regional differences, to avoid the parties’ ability to use forum selection to avoid
oversight.
C.

Scope of Power and Implementation

The guardian trustee is foreign in non-bankruptcy contexts, and scholars
and stakeholders may have concerns about unleashing a new entity into already
complicated litigation environments. A guardian trustee in its worst form could
pander to particular categories of stakeholders, overzealously fight over every
small nuance in a way that derails the process, 121 or even damage a system by
advocating for a separate agenda. Each of these scenarios is possible and can
only be remedied by careful design that implements safeguards. The statute or
119. The concern about influence from the executive branch is not merely theoretical. In 2007, a
committee of the House of Representatives took testimony on whether the U.S. Trustees improperly
attacked debtors for minor errors. See United States Trustee Program: Watch Dog or Attack Dog?, supra
note 83, at 1–2. Judge Cristol noted that the U.S Trustee focused on debtor abuse while overlooking
creditor abuses—an imbalance that did not appear in states with Bankruptcy Administrators. See id. at
173. Judge Cristol attributed the difference to “politicized input from Washington.” Id.
120. Of course, if trustees are created to assist with proceedings organized by administrative
agencies, it makes the most sense to position them within the structure of the executive branch to
resolve many of the same separation-of-powers issues.
121. The concern relating to overzealous representation is conceptually sound but practically
unlikely. A guardian trustee will have limited resources, and in all likelihood will be unable to sustain
the pernicious, knee-jerk objection patterns that cause concern. Additionally, arbiters will react
negatively to unfounded objections, therein providing a second check. A guardian trustee will have a
vested interest in protecting and cultivating its reputation before the arbiter—an interest that weighs
against abuse of its authority.
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rules establishing a guardian trustee must be drafted in a way that sets forth the
scope of its power, outlines the ways in which that power can be asserted, and
further directs the overseeing body to develop a set of clear policies and
practices to reduce the risk of overreaching. This is particularly true in instances
where existing systemic problems relate, at least in part, to the
overconcentration of power in a single stakeholder. In such contexts, the
protective measures outlined above are necessary to prevent a guardian trustee
from using its delegated power to upset the balance and exert too much
influence on the process, replicating the initial problem instead of solving it.
An added benefit of establishing a guardian trustee, instead of an adjunct
of the court, is that the court gives no deference to a guardian trustee. The
objection waged by a guardian trustee will carry weight simply by nature of the
expertise the entity develops in at-risk systems. However, the ultimate
decisionmaker retains full authority to accept or reject the objection (just as it
would with an objection raised by a party). In practice, the U.S. Trustee’s
objections are frequently overruled. 122 Although courts consider its viewpoints,
there is no pattern of strict adherence or rubber-stamping the position asserted
by the office. The same can be true of guardian trustees.
Careful design offers one check against problematic guardian trustees, but
until the entity is tested there is no certainty about its effectiveness. To further
remedy many of the concerns identified above relating to implementation,
adoption of the guardian trustee in other contexts should be incremental. What
works in bankruptcy will certainly need to be modified for the specific contours
of other litigation environments. For this reason, stakeholders and the public
are more likely to develop faith in, and enthusiasm for, a guardian trustee after
the concept has been proven through experimentation. As explained in Section
I.A, the Program was gradually expanded after the initial pilot program
provided a remedy to many of the public perception problems that plagued the
pre-Bankruptcy Code process. 123 Other guardian trustees should be similarly
piloted, both to create buy-in through proof of concept, and to ensure that the
device is a good fit.
While a certain environment may exhibit all of the characteristics that
suggest the potential benefit of a guardian trustee, a confluence of factors
inherent in that environment may render the trustee useless, or even
counterproductive. Particularities in the practitioner bar; the established power
allocation among parties; and even distinctions in case speed, cost, and
magnitude are just a few of the variables that could lead to failure of a guardian
122. See, e.g., Irve J. Goldman, United States Trustee Rebuked by New York Bankruptcy Judge for
Objecting to Retention of Nine West Interim CEO, JD SUPRA (July 11, 2018),
https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/united-states-trustee-rebuked-by-new-61878/ [https://perma.cc
/JS9W-TVCL].
123. See supra text accompanying notes 23–24.
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trustee. But such failures are not without gain. By evaluating why a guardian
trustee was ineffective, legislators, scholars, and stakeholders may gain
understanding about what steps have a better chance of success. In other words,
if the guardian trustee is not the answer, a failed pilot program experiment will
nonetheless offer useful information about the specific problems possessed by
the at-risk system and how to approach them.
III. DEPLOYING THE GUARDIAN TRUSTEE
Earlier discussion shows that a guardian trustee offers significant benefits
in the context of bankruptcy. Part of this mechanism’s success is due to a mix
of circumstances built into the bankruptcy system. This part begins the work of
deploying the trustee by highlighting common elements that threaten the sound
operation of other systems, which suggests that a guardian trustee could offer
comparable benefits. If overused, the guardian trustee would rightly be viewed
as burdensome, costly, and ineffective. To avoid this problem, the guardian
trustee must be used only in appropriate circumstances.
This part next identifies aggregate litigation, and in particular class action
settlements, as one decisionmaking process that would benefit from the addition
of a guardian trustee. Class actions share many key characteristics with the
distressed bankruptcy system described in Part I, including concerns about
judicial oversight and growing challenges with negative public perception. This
part highlights these characteristics and offers a blueprint for structuring a
guardian trustee in the class action context.
Finally, after taking into account the potential challenges that may arise
when creating new guardian trustees, this part identifies potential alternative
solutions and evaluates whether and when such alternatives may be superior to
a guardian trustee.
A.

Identifying At-Risk Systems

Only some systems will benefit from the addition of a guardian trustee.
Identifying those systems requires consideration of the characteristics a
particular environment should have to invite the use of a guardian trustee. The
system must be at-risk in ways that could be remedied by a neutral guardian,
and the risk must be substantial enough to justify the cost and imposition of a
guardian trustee.
The first characteristic is the arbiter’s inability to identify structural
threats. Perhaps the arbiter has insufficient access to information. This problem
could arise because of either the large volume of information that is relevant to
disputed matters or the parties’ ability to keep secret the self-serving aspects of
their actions. Additionally, the arbiter may have insufficient resources to
process and identify the problematic elements of the parties’ behavior. The
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arbiter may be subject to significant time constraints that do not permit
extended analysis, as is the case in a rapid-fire bankruptcy proceeding, 124 or the
arbiter may have a demanding caseload that prevents significant focus on threats
that are not raised by the parties. Finally, the arbiter may be incentivized to
favor a certain result, either through personal preferences and biases 125 or
because of external pressures. 126 The guardian trustee’s primary power is to
bring areas of concern to the ultimate decisionmaker’s attention through
selective challenges, particularly in instances where the parties are silent.
The second core characteristic is the likelihood that purportedly adverse
interests will align in a way that undermines, rather than advances, the goals of
the system. Most systems depend on the adversarial nature of the parties to
bring to light key issues and problems arising in a proceeding. 127 Sometimes,
however, absent stakeholders should have a voice in the process, and the third124. See Melissa B. Jacoby & Edward J. Janger, Ice Cube Bonds: Allocating the Price of Process in
Chapter 11 Bankruptcy, 123 YALE L.J. 862, 865–66, 871–72 (2014) (describing the breakneck speed of
many corporate bankruptcy filings and identifying a way to protect value while permitting space to
evaluate the best path forward for a debtor corporation).
125. See, e.g., Andrew J. Wistrich & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Implicit Bias in Judicial Decision Making:
How It Affects Judgment and What Judges Can Do About It, in AM. BAR ASS’N, ENHANCING JUSTICE:
REDUCING BIAS 87 (Sarah E. Redfield ed., 2017); Stephen Choi & Mitu Gulati, Bias in Judicial
Citations: A Window into the Behavior of Judges, J. LEGAL STUD. 87, 92–93 (2008); Chris Guthrie et al.,
Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777, 784 (2001) (outlining various forms of bias, including
hindsight and egocentric biases); Eric A. Posner, Does Political Bias in the Judiciary Matter?: Implications
of Judicial Bias Studies for Legal and Constitutional Reform, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 853, 858–63 (2008).
126. This can include system-based motivations, such as funding for the courts. For example, in
the context of a consumer debtor’s decision to file for Chapter 7 versus Chapter 13 bankruptcy, often
the complete discharge offered under Chapter 7 is a more viable fit for individuals who do not have
sufficient resources to continue carrying their debts and do not have a pressing need to keep their house
or automobile (key features for a Chapter 13 case). See WARREN ET AL., supra note 16, at 206–07. But
these individuals may not have enough money to pay their attorney’s fees upfront, as is required in
Chapter 7 cases. See How Much Does It Cost To File Bankruptcy?, NAT’L BANKR. F. (Apr. 2, 2020),
https://www.natlbankruptcy.com/how-much-does-it-cost-to-file-bankruptcy-2/
[https://perma.cc
/ZA2K-NUVW]. As a result, the debtors file for Chapter 13 for the sole purpose of financing their
professional fees (such instances are commonly called “fee-only” Chapter 13 cases). See Pamela Foohey
et al., “No Money Down” Bankruptcy, 90 S. CAL. L. REV. 1055, 1069 (2017) (explaining the fee-only
Chapter 13 case and its particular problems). Courts have expressed concerns about whether this use
of Chapter 13 is appropriate. See In re Brown, 742 F.3d 1309, 1319 (11th Cir. 2014) (affirming decision
that fee-only Chapter 13 case was not filed in “good faith” as required by 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(3)
(2018)). In other instances, courts reach a different result and approve of fee-only Chapter 13 filings.
See In re Wark, 542 B.R. 522, 527–28 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2015) (declining the U.S. Trustee’s challenge to
the propriety of a debtor filing a fee-only Chapter 13 when they are eligible and better suited for
Chapter 7). The Wark Court noted the very issue that may influence courts to favor Chapter 13 in such
circumstances: an in forma pauperis waiver is available in Chapter 7 cases to excuse payment of filing
fees, but no such waiver is available in Chapter 13 cases. Id. at 534 n.43. Even if the incentive does not
directly benefit an individual arbiter, but instead the arbiter’s broader entity, it may be enough to alter
otherwise rational behavior and impact litigant outcomes in an undesirable manner.
127. Jay Sterling Silver, Equality of Arms and the Adversarial Process: A New Constitutional Right,
1990 WIS. L. REV. 1007, 1008 (1990) (“[T]oday our system of justice is founded on the presumption
that the truth is more likely to emerge from the contest between zealous advocates.”).
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party trustee can serve a critical role by ensuring that additional perspectives
and separate interests of those non-participant stakeholders are taken into
account. In some instances, real-world complexities lead the parties, and
perhaps even the decisionmaker, to act in ways that depart from promoting the
purposes of the system in which the dispute arises. 128
Settlements illustrate this problem. Resolution of disputes by agreement
occurs in all litigation contexts, and usually the decision to settle reflects the
parties’ understanding that the benefit of the agreed resolution outweighs the
costs and uncertainty involved with continuing a proceeding. 129 Arbiters
generally favor settlement, as it avoids the need to direct large amounts of time
and energy to addressing each issue each case presents in a world marked by
congested dockets. However, settlements can be problematic when they are
high stakes, involve many parties (including absent constituencies), and are
required to comply with specialized legal mandates. 130 If all parties agree to a
particular settlement that violates these requirements, only an arbiter can cast
it aside for that reason. As shown above, the arbiter may be unable (or
unwilling) to identify and prevent such abuse. 131 A guardian trustee adds a check
on the parties, including the arbiter, by reviewing the settlement in a focused
way that protects the integrity of the system. This same logic may well apply
outside the context of settlements, including overseeing discovery and policing
ethical violations by counsel.
The key point is that some decisionmaking systems present distinctive
risks of malfunction. There is no singular indication of such systems, and
various elements can lead to their weaknesses. Red flags include the presence
of complex procedural rules, ambiguous statutory guidance, known loopholes,
and malleable standards of judicial review. If abuse occurs with high regularity,
it is likely that the system is inherently at-risk. Additionally, a system that
receives significant focus from scholars and commentators regarding such red
flags may well qualify.

128. While in most instances this alignment is due to a shared interest in avoiding the limitations,
it is also possible that one party may not agree with the action but is hesitant to challenge it. Regulated
entities, for example, may be adverse to the agency that controls their ability to do business (perhaps
through licensure or other grants of authority). Faced with concerns about whether their behavior
during the proceeding will impact future opportunities, regulated entities may strategically choose to
forego valid objections. Much like the U.S. Trustee takes the role of “bad cop” when other stakeholders
are focused on settlement negotiations, the guardian trustee can assume the task of highlighting abuses
without recourse.
129. See Robert J. Rhee, A Price Theory of Legal Bargaining: An Inquiry into the Selection of Settlement
and Litigation Under Uncertainty, 56 EMORY L.J. 619, 629–32 (2006).
130. One example includes the Bankruptcy Code’s priority scheme and absolute priority rule. See
supra text accompanying notes 34–35.
131. See supra notes 124–26 and accompanying text.
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Finally, a guardian trustee should be considered under circumstances in
which public trust in a system has eroded. 132 A combination of the above-listed
factors can lead to erosion of public trust, especially in instances where
individuals and companies are (or appear to be) stripped of their fundamental
rights within the very system that was intended to protect those rights. The
decay of public trust in a system is not easy to remedy. Even highly possible
reforms to existing structures are unlikely to shift the momentum of public
opinion until long after they are implemented. The addition of a guardian
trustee can offer a significant perception boost due to the watchdog’s core goal
of ensuring fair treatment of all stakeholders, including the general public.
Each of the warning signs present in problematic systems may combine in
varying degrees to render the systems at risk. No two systems possess the same
blend of challenges, and the effort to identify a system that is sufficiently atrisk to consider addition of a guardian trustee is more of an art than a science.
The next section undertakes that process by identifying particularly at-risk
characteristics in the aggregate litigation context.
B.

Aggregate Litigation as an At-Risk System

The most fruitful extension of the guardian trustee concept may well
involve its application in the context of aggregate litigation. 133 By definition,
aggregate litigation involves combining individual cases and claims within a
single proceeding, much like bankruptcy. 134 The procedural devices that permit
aggregation, including class actions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 135
and multidistrict litigation (“MDL”) under 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a), 136 provide
measurable benefits. Among other things, they facilitate the streamlined
resolution of large numbers of cases and the pursuit of just claims that would
be cost-prohibitive to bring on an individual basis. The structure of aggregate
litigation devices mirrors the bankruptcy system, which also collects cases
before a common arbiter and involves many individual claimants represented
only collectively by attorneys that they did not individually select. 137
Similar to the bankruptcy system that preceded the creation of the
Program, aggregate litigation is an at-risk system. This form of litigation has
132. As used in this Article, “public trust” should be understood to broadly encompass the
perspective of commentators, those who are or may become parties to a proceeding in the system, and
the general population at large.
133. Scholars have extensively studied the challenges and concerns that exist in aggregate
litigation, yet many of the same issues arise in other types of proceedings. For this reason, exploring
the benefits of a guardian trustee in aggregate litigation can also be instructive in other contexts.
134. See Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Financiers as Monitors in Aggregate Litigation, 87 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1273, 1275 n.2 (2012) [hereinafter Burch, Financiers as Monitors].
135. FED. R. CIV. P. 23.
136. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (2018).
137. See McKenzie, Bankruptcy Model, supra note 14, at 964–65.
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triggered widespread criticism based on the absence of adequate representation
of class members, manipulation of outcomes by opportunistic lawyers, and
divergent incentives among stakeholders which can lead to settlements not
aligned with the best interests of many individual claimants. 138 The lessons from
bankruptcy history may well suggest the wisdom of incorporating a guardian
trustee in the aggregate litigation decisionmaking process.
1. Aggregate Litigation Devices
To evaluate parallels between bankruptcy and aggregate litigation, one
must first understand the characteristics of each system. The next two
subsections lay the foundation for broader analysis by introducing key features
of the two primary aggregate litigation devices: class actions and multidistrict
litigation.
a.

Class Actions

The modern class action is the quintessential aggregation device of
American litigation. Class actions permit litigants to share the costs and burdens
of litigating their common claims, while also influencing and deterring the
behavior of wrongdoers that could be obligated to pay significant sums as a class
action defendant. 139 Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure outlines
the prerequisites that litigants must meet to certify a class. 140 Class actions have
evolved in the years since they were written into Rule 23. 141
Despite shifts in particular procedures, patterns, and practices, the core
challenges inherent in class action litigation remain the same. Class actions are
subject to collusion between fee-seeking class counsel and settling defendants,
and may involve unfair settlements and processes (particularly as to absent class
members), among other incentive issues. 142 For example, class counsel may be
incentivized to urge acceptance of a defendant’s settlement proposal that does
138. See Howard M. Erichson, Aggregation as Disempowerment: Red Flags in Class Action Settlements,
92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 859, 863–64 (2016) (identifying systemic challenges of aggregate litigation).
139. See David Rosenberg, Decoupling Deterrence and Compensation Functions in Mass Tort Class
Actions for Future Loss, 88 VA. L. REV. 1871, 1874–75 (2004) (outlining underlying benefits of aggregate
devices).
140. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a) (requiring a class to show numerosity, commonality, typicality, and
adequacy of representation); FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b) (outlining three potential types of class actions that
a putative class may satisfy). Additionally, courts have imposed the implied requirement that a
definable claim exists, that representative members have standing, and that the claim is live. See Tom
Murphy, Implied Class Warfare: Why Rule 23 Needs an Explicit Ascertainability Requirement in the Wake of
Byrd v. Aaron’s Inc., 57 B.C. L. REV. E. SUPP. 34, 35 (2016).
141. See McKenzie, Bankruptcy Model, supra note 14, at 973–79 (describing the series of decisions
that undermined class action utility and funneled litigants into quasi-class action devices).
142. See Burch, Financiers as Monitors, supra note 134, at 1283; Erichson, supra note 138, at 861
(discussing coupon settlements and cy pres remedies as specific instances of unjust settlement
practices).
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not provide maximum recovery to individual claimants, but does offer rich
compensation for class counsel. 143 Recent developments in Supreme Court
jurisprudence have severely limited the number of classes that are eligible for
certification, 144 and the prevalent use of class action waivers in arbitration
agreements has funneled many potential class actions away from the federal
courts. 145 The class action device maintains much of its power, but the reach of
that power has narrowed significantly. To fill the void, alternative forms of nonclass aggregation have increased in popularity. 146
b.

Multidistrict Litigation

The Framers could not have contemplated the large-scale and multijurisdictional complex cases of modern American society. A price-fixing scandal
at General Electric in the 1960s led to numerous civil and criminal
proceedings. 147 Congress created the MDL statute to try to address some of the
problems created by the “duplication of discovery and inconsistent verdicts”
that came out of the GE litigation. 148 The legislation’s objective was “to provide
centralized management under court supervision of pretrial proceedings of
multidistrict litigation to assure the ‘just and efficient conduct’ of such
actions.” 149 The Judicial Conference of the United States, under the direction
of Chief Justice Earl Warren, established the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict
Litigation (“JPML”), a special panel to handle the cases. 150
The MDL statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1407, allows the JPML to override a
plaintiff’s choice of forum and consolidate similar cases in a single court when
three factors are present: “(1) ‘one or more common questions of fact are
pending in different districts,’ (2) a transfer would serve ‘the convenience of
parties and witnesses,’ and (3) a transfer would ‘promote the just and efficient
conduct of [the actions].’” 151 Generally, the JPML will certify a group of cases
143. See, e.g., McKenzie, Bankruptcy Model, supra note 14, at 971–73; Susan P. Koniak, Feasting
While the Widow Weeps: Georgine v. Amchem Products, Inc., 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1045, 1053–55
(1995) (describing conflicts between class action claimants and class counsel).
144. See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 350–52 (2011) (imposing a more
rigorous analysis on putative plaintiffs at the certification stage).
145. See Brian T. Fitzpatrick, End of Class Actions?, 57 ARIZ. L. REV. 156, 156 (2015).
146. McKenzie, Bankruptcy Model, supra note 14, at 979 (noting the shift toward nonclass
aggregation due to limitations on class action certification).
147. See Phil C. Neal & Perry Goldberg, The Electrical Equipment Antitrust Cases: Novel Judicial
Administration, 50 A.B.A. J. 621, 621–22 tbls.1 & 3 (1964) (discussing the increase of complex cases and
noting that more than 1800 civil damage actions had been filed in 31 different federal district courts).
148. Lori J. Parker, Cause of Action Involving Claim Transferred to Multidistrict Litigation, in 23
CAUSES OF ACTION 2D 185 (2003), Westlaw (database updated Mar. 2020).
149. H.R. REP. NO. 90-1130, at 2 (1968); see also Yvette Ostolaza & Michelle Hartmann, Overview
of Multidistrict Litigation Rules at the State and Federal Level, 26 REV. LITIG. 47, 49–50 (2007).
150. H.R. REP. NO. 90-1130, at 3.
151. Pinney v. Nokia, Inc., 402 F.3d 430, 451 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a)
(2018)).
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into an MDL when “civil actions involving one or more common questions of
fact are pending in different districts,” 152 though a balance of factors ultimately
guides the certification process. 153 Once certified, the JPML selects a transferee
court for the MDL that will control all pretrial and discovery procedures. 154
Though cases originally filed in the MDL forum stay with the transferee court,
the remaining cases are remanded to their original (transferor) courts if they are
not settled or dismissed. 155
Similar to class actions, MDLs have a number of elements that threaten
structural integrity. First, MDLs breed posturing and gamesmanship among
counsel who are vying to be selected for the lucrative position of leading
representation of the transferred claimants before the transferee judge. 156
Second, even though MDLs are intended to resolve only pretrial issues, the
reality is that only a small percentage of cases return to local courts for review
on the merits. 157 The representatives resolve the remainder via private
settlements, and counsel for both claimants and defendants are incentivized to
reach an agreement. 158 Finally, review and approval of proposed attorney fees
by the transferee court (an integral part of any MDL settlement) may be subject
to the pressure of established precedent for resolving the litigation without
transferring actions back to their original jurisdiction. 159
2. The Guardian Trustee in Aggregate Litigation
Aggregate litigation exhibits each of the indicators of an at-risk system
identified in Section III.A. For this reason, and because it so closely parallels
the bankruptcy system, aggregate litigation is a paradigmatic system for
implementation of a guardian trustee. First, because aggregate litigation cases
152. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a).
153. It should be noted that the intended goals of the MDL process are frustrated when
certification is not promptly administered. See In re Asbestos Products Liability Litigation (No. VI),
771 F. Supp. 415, 424 (J.P.M.L. 1991) (delaying certification of MDL despite thousands of cases filed
nationwide resulted in inconsistent discovery and decisions); see also Parker, supra note 148, at 185
(discussing the same).
154. Though not discussed in this Article, the transferee court selection is often one of the most
contentious legal battles in the MDL process. See Mark A. Chavez, The MDL Process, in 13TH ANNUAL
CONSUMER FINANCIAL SERVICES LITIGATION INSTITUTE 2008 117, 124–25 (2008).
155. Id. at 135–36.
156. See Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Monopolies in Multidistrict Litigation, 70 VAND. L. REV. 67,
81–84 (2017) (outlining the process for selecting leadership in multidistrict litigation that strongly
favors repeat counsel for both plaintiffs and defendants) [hereinafter Burch, Monopolies].
157. See Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Disaggregating, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 667, 681 (2013)
[hereinafter Burch, Disaggregating] (explaining that a “mere 3.425%” of multidistrict litigation cases are
remanded to their transferor districts for trial).
158. Id. at 678.
159. Burch, Monopolies, supra note 156, at 86 (identifying concerns relating to judicial involvement
in MDLs and suggesting adjustments that would transform judges from a contributor to unjust MDL
practices to an effective check); McKenzie, Bankruptcy Model, supra note 14, at 984, 992 (describing fee
pressure of settlement in the Vioxx case).
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involve a variety of claims pending before a single court, and because many of
the internal negotiations and strategy maneuvers will not involve the trial judge,
judges lack the ability to identify and respond to key concerns. 160 Second, the
incentives of various parties in aggregate litigation can align in a way that
undermines the interests of absent parties. 161 Third, aggregate litigation systems
have inherent features that invite abuse, including (among others) the selection
and compensation of counsel, the presence of opt-out rules, and the process for
court review of key case issues. 162 Finally, aggregate litigation devices face
intense public perception threats that include ongoing calls for reform and
improvement. 163
Each of these features of aggregate litigation share similarities with the
bankruptcy system, which has benefited from implementation of a guardian
trustee. The addition of a guardian trustee in aggregate litigation would provide
a check similar to what the U.S. Trustee offers in bankruptcy. Above all, when
the parties’ interests align and the decisionmaker lacks either the information
or the incentives to identify problems, a guardian trustee may bring such
challenges and concerns before the court.
Approval of class action settlements is among the most problematic
features of the at-risk aggregate litigation system. While the court must approve
any class action settlement, 164 commentators criticize both the ability and
resources of an arbiter to oversee the settlement process effectively and the
tendency of courts to approve settlements. 165 If, for example, a class action
committee representing absent claimants decides that the benefit to accepting
settlement outweighs the cost and uncertainty of further challenges (and,
perhaps defense counsel has provided committee counsel with sufficient
bonuses or benefits to encourage acceptance of an offer), then the arbiter may
not be presented with sufficient information to identify whether the settlement
should be approved. 166 This is particularly true when the arbiter is already
incentivized by a crowded docket and internal pressure from the arbiter’s own
administrative entity to quickly resolve each case.
160. Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Publicly Funded Objectors, 19 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 47, 50
(2018) [hereinafter Burch, Objectors] (“The bigger question is how we ensure that judges have the
necessary information (and incentive) to monitor the attorneys and ensure that the settlement is fair
when the adversarial system breaks down.”).
161. Id. at 51 (noting the inability of the adversary system to highlight “scurrilous behavior” in
class settlements due to the shared incentives on all sides to pursue approval).
162. See supra Sections III.B.1.a–b.
163. See McKenzie, Bankruptcy Model, supra note 14, at 963.
164. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2) (requiring that a settlement be “fair, reasonable, and adequate”).
Note that no associated provision vests MDL transferee courts with authority to approve settlement
agreements.
165. See Burch, Objectors, supra note 160, at 48–49.
166. See Rubenstein, supra note 90, at 1440–51 (identifying agency problems in class actions and
outlining insufficient efforts to mitigate such problems).
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In the case of multidistrict litigation, many proposed settlements are rife
with “ethically questionable means for achieving litigation closure,” such as
walk-away provisions for defendants or bonus payments for 100% settlement
participation, 167 all of which manipulate attorney behavior in ways that may not
align with their client’s interests. Matters are further compounded by the fact
that in aggregate litigation each individual claimant—commonly represented
only collectively by the larger group’s counsel—does not have the ability or
financial incentive to monitor the case or counsel’s actions. For these reasons,
the next subsection addresses how the use of a guardian trustee might improve
settlements in the aggregate litigation context.
3. Design and Structure of the “Aggregate Settlement Guardian”
As outlined above, the vast majority of aggregate litigation cases end in
settlement, and the process for approving aggregate litigation settlements
suffers from significant integrity and public perception threats. Bankruptcy
cases also commonly involve settlements, and the U.S. Trustee plays an
important role in checking the value and propriety of settlements within that
system. 168 Similarly, a guardian trustee could mitigate many of the problematic
elements of aggregate litigation settlements by highlighting collusion among
the parties; pointing out the court’s inattention to outcomes that circumvent
the spirit, if not the letter, of the rules that bind settlement; and, above all,
providing an independent voice to a process in which all current stakeholders
may be beholden to other interests.
A newly created guardian trustee, named the “Aggregate Settlement
Guardian,” could be designed to accomplish the above stated goals in the
settlement context. Congress could require that any party seeking approval of
a settlement (or attorney’s fees earned in connection with a settlement in an
aggregate litigation case) must provide notice of the settlement and a certain
amount of information about the case to the Aggregate Settlement Guardian’s
office. An Aggregate Settlement Guardian would be assigned to the case, and
would have a limited period, perhaps thirty or sixty days, to evaluate the
settlement. 169 If the Aggregate Settlement Guardian does not offer comments
or objections to the settlement within that window, the parties would then be
permitted to proceed before the court and seek approval of the settlement.
Should the Aggregate Settlement Guardian see potential areas of concern, she
could (1) ask the parties to provide more information (through her discovery
powers) or (2) file an objection with the court seeking a hearing (through her
167. Burch, Financiers as Monitors, supra note 134, at 1283.
168. See supra Section I.C. See generally 8 NORTON BANKR. L. & PRAC. 3D § 167:1, Westlaw
(database updated Apr. 2020) (describing the procedural process for approving settlements).
169. This concept exists in bankruptcy law where settlement proposals may be approved by the
court after the parties have notice and an opportunity to object. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 9019(a).
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ability to appear and be heard). 170 If the Aggregate Settlement Guardian objects
to terms in the settlement, and the court approves the settlement over that
objection, then she would be able to appeal the decision. The Aggregate
Settlement Guardian’s appeal would provide a second layer of oversight on the
court.
To avoid principle-agent issues, the Aggregate Settlement Guardian could
be part of a new “Office of Aggregate Litigation Oversight,” housed within the
Administrative Office of the United States Courts (“AO”), the administrative
agency of the judicial branch. 171 In this way, the Aggregate Settlement Guardian
would be insulated from the influence of the executive and legislative branches,
but would also have sufficient distance from individual members of the
judiciary. A panel of Aggregate Settlement Guardians should be selected by the
Judicial Conference of the United States to serve for five-year terms, subject to
removal by the Director of the AO. The Aggregate Settlement Guardians
should be organized regionally, grouped and allocated to correspond with the
percentage of aggregate litigation cases pending within the region. 172
The Aggregate Settlement Guardian, as a hypothetical guardian trustee,
would have a very limited zone of influence within the aggregate litigation
system. This purposefully limited scope reflects a desire to impact the most
problematic part of the at-risk system (settlement), without imposing
significant costs, burdens, or delays on the parties or court. By starting with a
narrow oversight function and evaluating costs versus impact, this new guardian
trustee could be deployed in a way that introduces non-bankruptcy practitioners
and commentators to the potential benefits of the device. Should the Aggregate
Settlement Guardian be successful, its role could be expanded within aggregate
litigation to reach other important case issues that may face similar challenges
(such as discovery or other pre-trial issues in MDLs). Introducing the
Aggregate Settlement Guardian would be a first step toward expanding the
guardian trustee.
C.

Challenges and Alternative Solutions to the Guardian Trustee

Although the previous section highlights the specific manner in which a
guardian trustee could improve aggregate litigation, it does not eliminate the
stark reality that the guardian trustee may have significant shortcomings.
Plausible criticisms about the guardian trustee system include: (1) that it would
170. See supra Section II.A.1.
171. This is the same structural location of the Bankruptcy Administrator Program. See supra
Section I.D.
172. While it would be possible to create separate panels for class actions and MDLs (the latter of
which could be situated under the control of the JPML instead of the AO), there are significant benefits
to having one centralized oversight entity that is able to develop aggregate litigation expertise and
observe patterns and trends in the different devices.
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increase costs and add the hassle of dealing with yet another voice in the
litigation process, (2) that guardian trustees may lack true independence and
instead contribute to the deterioration of at-risk systems, and (3) that guardian
trustees may abuse their power and take too strong of a role in the established
adversary system. While Part II establishes that careful design can ameliorate
these concerns, there is no guarantee that any specific iteration of a guardian
trustee will be perfectly deployed.
Recall that the guardian trustee is not the sole option to remedy systemic
abuse. From an institutional design perspective, legislators should ask why a
guardian trustee is superior to alternatives. Section III.A identifies
characteristics that might invite use of a guardian trustee, including the
decisionmaker’s insufficient access to information, likelihood that the parties’
interests will align to circumvent the system’s intended protections, the
existence of inherent tension points in a particular system, and erosion of public
trust in the system’s integrity. If these elements could be addressed by
alternative solutions, the guardian trustee may not be necessary.
1. The Representative Trustee
First, the benefits of a third-party trustee may be most effectively and
efficiently achieved by adding a representative trustee—that is, an entity that
acts on behalf of a specific absent stakeholder. In some contexts, a representative
trustee may solve systemic issues just as well as a guardian trustee, and without
significantly modifying the litigation system’s status quo. In a legal system
premised on fairness and justice, considering the interests of unrepresented
entities adds significant value. Legislators should take care to consider these
interests, especially in complex proceedings. The representative trustee serves
as a proxy for absent interests, balancing the perspectives that are presented to
the decisionmaker. Different representative trustees may advocate for different
interests in different ways, but their core function is to advocate for a specific
stakeholder.
Congress and the courts have shown a willingness to provide advocates for
specialized interests by expanding a proceeding to include a representative
trustee. In class actions, intervenors raise objections on behalf of individual class
members to challenge potentially unfair settlements, notwithstanding the fact
that the class members are represented by class counsel who negotiated the
settlement. 173 In the criminal context, crime victims have limited rights at
varying levels of the state and federal systems to appear and be heard in the

173. See, e.g., John E. Lopatka & D. Brooks Smith, Class Action Professional Objectors: What To Do
About Them?, 39 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 865, 885–87 (2012) (explaining the incentives that may lead to
intervenors raising objections in the class action context).
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prosecution of a criminal defendant. 174 Both the Supreme Court and federal
appellate courts may appoint amici to argue for a particular perspective that
neither party will take, but which the court views as important to consider. 175 In
family law disputes, a guardian ad litem represents the best interests of a
juvenile, even if the juvenile is not able to speak for herself. 176 The bankruptcy
system also includes representative trustees. 177 For example, in medical center
bankruptcies the interests of patients are represented by a patient care
ombudsman, 178 and a future claims representative appears in mass tort
bankruptcies on behalf of those who do not yet have claims. 179
174. See Paul G. Cassell & Steven Joffee, The Crime Victim’s Expanding Role in a System of Public
Prosecution: A Response to the Critics of the Crime Victims’ Rights Act, 105 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 164,
181 (2010) (describing crime victims’ rights as an “important part” of an “effectively functioning
criminal justice system”).
175. See, e.g., Reply Brief for Court-Appointed Amica Curiae on Jurisdiction, United States v.
Windsor, 570 U.S. 744 (2013) (No. 12-307), 2013 WL 1143557.
176. See Mark H. Bonner & Jennifer A. Sheriff, A Child Needs a Champion: Guardian Ad Litem
Representation for Prenatal Children, 19 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 511, 514–15 (2013) (describing
the role and statutory support for appointment of a guardian ad litem to specially represent children in
legal proceedings impacting their rights). Interestingly, different states require the guardian ad litem
to take different approaches to representing the interests of the minor. For example, some states permit
the guardian ad litem to represent the subjective, voiced interests the minor raises, while in others the
guardian ad litem is required to objectively view what is in the best interest of the minor without regard
to his or her individual preferences. See Linda D. Elrod, Client-Directed Lawyers for Children: It Is the
“Right” Thing To Do, 27 PACE L. REV. 869, 908–11 (2007) (outlining differences in guardian ad litem
standards and noting that some jurisdictions require the same guardian to offer both perspectives).
Under the latter, objective standard, the representative trustee may simultaneously advance both the
juvenile’s interests as well as those of the greater system, to the extent such interests align. In contrast,
where the guardian ad litem is bound to advocate the subjective desires of the juvenile, the resulting
positions may ultimately conflict with the juvenile system’s established preference for acting in the
best interest of the child.
177. Note that representative trustees in bankruptcy do not take the place of, or eliminate the need
for, a guardian trustee (the U.S. Trustee). Similarly, the presence of representative trustees may be
necessary in addition to guardian trustees in other contexts.
178. The patients under the debtor’s care are not creditors, and without the addition of the
representative trustee, decisions could be made in the course of the bankruptcy that could negatively
impact the quality of patient care. See Nicholas A. Huckaby, Toward a Workable Standard for Appointing
a Patient Care Ombudsman: Proposed Changes for Applying § 333 of the Bankruptcy Code, 48 U. TOL. L.
REV. 367, 369 (2017).
179. When known damages arise due to a company’s product or practice, the already-affected
creditors can engage in the bankruptcy process. But often, many individuals have not yet experienced
the harm that will likely follow months or years after the bankruptcy distributions have been made.
The future claims representative appears in such cases to preserve value for individuals who are likely
to develop claims in the future. See, e.g., In re Johns-Manville Corp., 36 B.R. 743, 758 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1984) (appointing future claims representative on behalf of asbestos victims without currently
manifesting injuries); Mark D. Plevin, Leslie A. Epley & Clifton S. Elgarte, The Future Claims
Representative in Prepackaged Asbestos Bankruptcies: Conflicts of Interest, Strange Alliances, and Unfamiliar
Duties for Burdened Bankruptcy Courts, 62 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 271, 272 (2006); Frederick Tung,
The Future Claims Representative in Mass Tort Bankruptcy: A Preliminary Inquiry, 3 CHAP. L. REV. 43, 44
(2000). Concerns about representing the interests of future claimants are not limited to the bankruptcy
context. See, e.g., Deborah R. Hensler, Bringing Shutts into the Future: Rethinking Protection of Future
Claimants in Mass Tort Class Actions, 74 UMKC L. REV. 585, 588 (2006) (arguing that existing
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As identified above, many examples of representative trustees already exist
in the U.S. legal system, and scholars continue to advocate for the development
of additional representative entities that give a voice to otherwise unrepresented
constituents. 180 Because guardian and representative trustees can serve many of
the same purposes, including providing an additional perspective to the
decisionmaker and challenging unfair positions or abuses of the process, one
might argue that increased reliance on representative trustees offers an easier
solution than introducing a guardian trustee. Indeed, there is more precedent
for the use of representative trustees, and the relative cost and effort involved
in appointing or creating a representative trustee may be modest when
compared to implementing a guardian trustee.
In many instances, however, the representative trustee is an imperfect
substitute for the guardian trustee. Representative trustees’ success as an
alternative for independent oversight may be limited by incentives.
Representative trustees do not serve as a check on the process when their
constituency is incentivized to cease investigating and challenging the parties.
In many cases, the representative and guardian trustees will both press the same
issues that address systemic integrity concerns, and having the advocacy of a
representative trustee may give the arbiter notice of potential abuses. At
bottom, however, representative trustees are beholden to a particular
constituency. If the incentives of that constituency happen to align with those
of the party needing a check, the desired value of a trustee is lost. There will
inevitably be instances in which representative trustees do not raise challenges
to structural integrity threats because the representative trustee’s stakeholder
benefits from such threats. 181 Savvy parties to a dispute will identify the interest
of a representative trustee, and create ways to align themselves with that
interest or otherwise incentivize the trustee to set aside valid concerns. This
happens with some regularity in bankruptcy, where a sufficient settlement

protections cannot adequately protect the interests of certain classes of claimants in mass aggregate
proceedings). For example, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit recently unwound a class
action settlement due to inadequate representation where the same class counsel represented both
current and future claimants. See In re Payment Card Interchange Fee & Merch. Disc. Antitrust Litig.,
827 F.3d 223, 242 (2d Cir. 2016).
180. See, e.g., Burch, Financiers as Monitors, supra note 134, at 1276–77 (describing the potential of
third-party financiers to police settlements and mitigate other principal-agent problems); Burch,
Objectors, supra note 160, at 49 (suggesting the use of public funds to subsidize the work of nonprofit
objectors in class actions); Edward H. Cooper, The (Cloudy) Future of Class Actions, 40 ARIZ. L. REV.
923, 950 (1998) (“It also may be desirable to appoint some form of independent representative for the
claimants that is distinguished from counsel by a method of compensation that reduces the risk of
conflicting interests.”).
181. See Erichson, supra note 138, at 863 (outlining the various instances where defendants’ and
class action lawyers’ interests align to create disempowering outcomes for claimants).
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payment can silence legitimate challenges from a representative trustee. 182
Representative trustees may serve as a cure in some contexts, but their
vulnerabilities prevent them from offering a full antidote to systemic threats.
2. Supplementing the Arbiter
In addition to representative trustees, certain problems that could be
remedied by creation of a guardian trustee—including an arbiter’s inferior
access to information and its insufficient time and support to effectively
evaluate problematic elements—might instead be solved by simply providing
greater resources to the arbiter. This alternative would almost certainly cause
less upheaval, require fewer changes to existing processes, and cost less money.
Arbiters already have access to adjuncts in various contexts, such as special
masters, amici, neutral experts, and magistrates. 183 Increased reliance on these
and similar supplemental resources may help the arbiter uncover abuses that
would otherwise go undiscovered, or challenge the parties in a way that may
not have been possible absent the additional help. In many cases, supplemental
resources may be enough to remedy at-risk systems.
But, as outlined above, arbiters may also suffer from the very same
incentive problems that generate systemic integrity concerns. Increased support
will not fix non-resource-based challenges, including the impact of various
forms of bias and viewpoint-driven decisionmaking, 184 along with a potential
predisposition to avoid work. 185 Such problems may persist, or even become
more entrenched, if the arbiter receives additional resources. 186
Supplemental resources cannot solve additional characteristics of at-risk
systems. For example, resources will not fix a system that has procedures and
standards—such as an overly generous standard of review—that do not require
a decisionmaker to stop damaging behavior. In such instances, an arbiter will be
able to hold onto his potential biases. The same is true if an arbiter is unlikely
to receive complete information from the parties (even with greater resources)

182. See, e.g., Michelle M. Harner & Jamie Marincic, Committee Capture? An Empirical Analysis of
the Role of Creditors’ Committees in Business Reorganizations, 64 VAND. L. REV. 747, 753 (2011) (explaining
that self-interested creditors’ committees can alter the course of a bankruptcy case and lead to results
that do not maximize value).
183. See 28 U.S.C. § 631 (authorizing magistrate judges); FED. R. APP. P. 29 (outlining amicus
guidelines); FED. R. CIV. P. 53(a) (providing for special masters); FED. R. EVID. 706 (permitting
appointment of neutral experts).
184. See infra note 125 (collecting scholarship outlining biases in decisionmaking).
185. Stephen J. Choi et al., Professionals or Politicians: The Uncertain Empirical Case for an Elected
Rather than Appointed Judiciary, 26 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 290 (2009) (outlining laziness and lack of
productivity as a negative quality embodied by some judges).
186. See, e.g., Masua Sagiv, Cultural Bias in Judicial Decision Making, 35 B.C. J.L. & SOC. JUST. 229,
250–52 (2015) (outlining potential for purportedly neutral cultural experts to simply echo the court’s
existing biases while cloaking those objections in a veil of objectivity).
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due to rules that rely on the parties for disclosure. 187 Furthermore, if public
perception of a system has eroded, it is difficult for the arbiter alone to recapture
public trust by adding more resources.
Unlike an arbiter with supplemental resources, a guardian trustee is
designed with a layer of independence from the existing process and a focus on
representing all stakeholders, including the public. These traits permit the
guardian trustee to effectively rebuild public trust in at-risk systems.
Additionally, a guardian trustee’s narrow focus on certain types of proceedings
permits it to become a subject matter expert in the category of cases where it
appears, thereby developing a base of knowledge to speak authoritatively about
whether a particular case presents concerning problems. 188
These challenges warrant careful analysis. Many situations that at first
glance seem ripe for addition of a guardian trustee might, on closer review, be
aptly fixed by adding a representative trustee or increasing the resources of the
arbiter. Successfully identifying such instances limits the expansion of guardian
trustees to situations where they offer the best available solution. With these
limitations in mind, the next section offers two examples of at-risk systems in
which the guardian trustee should be considered as a potential solution to a
recognized system failure.
IV. EXPANDING THE GUARDIAN TRUSTEE
Once litigants, arbiters, and legislators recognize the potential benefits of
the guardian trustee, the concept could be successfully implemented in a
number of contexts beyond aggregate litigation. While concerns regarding
aggregate litigation are among the most apparent and well-studied, the same
issues arise in other types of proceedings. Certain administrative and criminal
proceedings also exhibit the factors identified in Section III.A. In each of these
contexts, the guardian trustee could appear in a proceeding to oversee and raise
challenges to specific filings, motions, responses, or issues that the designing
entity identifies as problematic.
A.

Administrative Proceedings

Administrative agencies play a powerful role in the American legal system,
offering regulations and guidance relating to the specific subject matter of their

187. See infra Section IV.B (discussing disclosure problems with Brady challenges).
188. An arbiter could hypothetically decide to create a dedicated “class settlement” special master
or neutral expert that would develop expertise in evaluating and bringing to light problems in class
actions. The question remains whether the public would buy into the idea and trust the independence
of an entity that remains connected with, and arguably beholden to, the individual judge overseeing a
proceeding.
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delegated focus. 189 Most agencies are also tasked with enforcing the various
regulations and enabling acts promulgated by Congress. 190 These enforcement
actions take a number of forms, and may occur as adjudications either in federal
court through agency lawsuits; within the agency’s dedicated enforcement body;
or in other, quasi-judicial forums with agency oversight. 191 Agency enforcement
and adjudication are subject to some of the same challenges that plague the
federal court system, in addition to other concerns that are specific to
administrative agencies. Guardian trustees could be deployed in the
administrative agency enforcement context where proceedings have insufficient
procedures or inadequate protections in place to ensure fairness. 192
Formal adjudication proceedings before an Administrative Law Judge
(“ALJ”) are one instance where a guardian trustee could benefit systemic
integrity. 193 ALJs do not face the same appointment, removal, and tenure
protections as Article III judges, and as a result they may be subject to
constitutional challenges. 194 Furthermore, in recent years, the legitimacy of and
policies surrounding ALJ enforcement proceedings have been the focus of great
scrutiny. Agencies such as the SEC, 195 the Federal Energy Regulatory
189. J.R. Deshazo & Jody Freeman, The Congressional Competition To Control Delegated Power, 81
TEX. L. REV. 1443, 1456 (2003) (identifying Congress’s ability to limit agency’s action through
“substantive standards or limits that the agency must implement”).
190. See Rachel E. Barkow, Overseeing Agency Enforcement, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1129, 1131
(2016).
191. Id. at 1132.
192. The concept of implementing independent checks and oversight is familiar to administrative
agencies, which are commonly subject to such review in the rulemaking portion of their delegated
authority.
193. See Kent Barnett, Resolving the ALJ Quandry, 66 VAND. L. REV. 797, 817–20 (2013) (outlining
the due process challenges ALJs face and suggesting approaches to mitigate such concerns).
194. Note that an ALJ is materially different from an administrative judge (“AJ”). While both may
be involved with hearing agency proceedings, ALJs are governed by the formal adjudication rules
imposed by the Administrative Procedures Act (“APA”), 5 U.S.C. § 554(a) (2018), while AJs are mere
agency employees, subject to none of the APA’s protections or requirements. See Kent Barnett, Against
Administrative Judges, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1643, 1646–47 (2016) (outlining the distinctions between
ALJs and AJs). Although proceedings overseen by AJs are potentially even more wrought with
problems, see id. at 1648, and could likely also benefit from implementation of a guardian trustee, the
tool would be better deployed in the more formal context of ALJ adjudication for a number of reasons.
AJs have broader duties and more varied procedural standards than ALJs because they come from
different agencies across the breadth of the executive branch and are not governed by a single, common
statute. This would pose logistical challenges to guardian trustees, and it would be extremely difficult
to develop guardian trustees with sufficient expertise with the substance and procedures of each
individual agency’s AJs to provide any value. In contrast, guardian trustees could more efficiently and
effectively be implemented to oversee ALJ proceedings, despite small differences among agencies,
because the APA provides the basic obligations by which ALJs must conduct proceedings.
195. See, e.g., Barnett, supra note 194, at 1645–46 (outlining the controversy surrounding the SEC’s
preference for agency adjudication versus bringing a case in federal court). But see Urska Velikonja, Are
SEC’s Administrative Law Judges Biased? An Empirical Investigation, 92 WASH. L. REV. 315, 319–21
(2017) (conducting an empirical study of SEC success rates and concluding that the media coverage of
perceived forum selection is supported by inconclusive data).
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Commission (“FERC”), 196 and the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”), 197
among others, allegedly funnel cases into ALJ enforcement rather than Article
III courts to obtain better outcomes. Critics emphasize that agency proceedings
do not provide the same procedural protections put in place for court
proceedings by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in federal court, and as a
result defendants are disadvantaged when their case is tried through ALJ
enforcement. 198 This is particularly true in light of questions about whether
agency adjudication is impartial 199 and the separation-of-powers concerns that
surround administrative agencies. 200
Though some statistical data suggests the SEC’s preference for ALJ
enforcement actions may not alone negatively impact outcomes, 201 other
research indicates that the SEC’s leverage in choosing agency enforcement over
federal court adjudication has increased the average settlement amount that

196. See Kenneth Irvin, Terence Healey & Christopher J. Polito, “Basic Fairness” and the Future of
FERC Enforcement Proceedings, FORBES
(May
4, 2017,
4:12
PM),
https://
www.forbes.com/sites/energysource/2017/05/04/basic-fairness-and-the-future-of-ferc-enforcementproceedings/#3f307f889e2b [https://perma.cc/3MGK-ZN2A] (“FERC’s enforcement proceedings
thus far lack . . . meaningful judicial review, leaving energy companies to grapple with inconsistent,
ambiguous FERC rulings that often appear to rubber stamp the allegations assembled by FERC’s
enforcement division.”).
197. See, e.g., Oral Argument at 23:28–24:20, LabMD, Inc. v. FTC, 894 F.3d 1221 (11th Cir. 2018)
(No. 16-16270) (questioning whether there was “collusion between [the reporting entity] and the
government,” and noting that “the aroma that comes out of the investigation in this case is that [the
reporting entity] was shaking down private industry with the help of the FTC”),
http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/oral-argument-recordings?title=&field_oar_case_name_value=labMD
&field_oral_argument_value%5Bvalue%5D%5Byear%5D=&field_oral_argument_date_value%5Bvalue
%5D%5Bmonth%5D [https://perma.cc/3ADH-338X].
198. See, e.g., Jodi L. Avergun et al., Financial CHOICE Act Would Complicate the Choices in Bringing
and Defending Against SEC Cases, NAT’L L. REV. (June 13, 2017), https://www.natlawreview.com
/article/financial-choice-act-would-complicate-choices-bringing-and-defending-against-sec [https://
perma.cc/JW5N-NHN6] (“In an administrative proceeding, a respondent has no right of trial by jury,
limited rights to discovery or to engage in motion practice (e.g., no depositions and limited subpoena
rights), is not entitled to the benefit of the procedural protections conferred by the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure and the Federal Rules of Evidence, is subject to an accelerated schedule for completion
of trial, and is required to appeal to the SEC before having the right to appeal in federal court.”).
199. Barnett, supra note 194, at 1648.
200. See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in the
Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461, 462 (2003) (“From the birth of the administrative state,
we have struggled to describe our regulatory government as the legitimate child of a constitutional
democracy.”); David S. Rubenstein, Administrative Federalism as Separation of Powers, 72 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 171, 183–89 (2015) (highlighting ongoing separation-of-powers threats in the administrative
agency context).
201. See Joseph A. Grundfest, Fair or Foul?: SEC Administrative Proceedings and Prospects for Reform
Through Removal Legislation, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 1143, 1178 (2016) (“[T]he data suggest that, in the
aggregate, the Commission has no particular advantage or disadvantage in federal court or before an
ALJ.”); Velikonja, supra note 195, at 366; David Zaring, Enforcement Discretion at the SEC, 94 TEX. L.
REV. 1155, 1189 (2016) (“[T]here is no statistically significant distinction between the rates of
success.”).
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defendants pay and expanded the number of cases that the agency reviews. 202
In any event, public perception of these fora is so negative that legislators have
interceded on behalf of constituents. On June 8, 2017, the House of
Representatives passed the Financial CHOICE Act (the “CHOICE Act”),
which is designed as a partial repeal of the 2010 Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act. 203 Commentators have primarily
focused on the CHOICE Act’s many provisions that impact the financial
regulation sector. 204 What is relevant for purposes of this paper, however, is a
separate provision in the CHOICE Act that would require creation of an SEC
“Enforcement Ombudsman” to act as an independent liaison between the SEC
and any person who is subject to the agency’s enforcement power. 205
Additionally, the CHOICE Act requires creation of an SEC committee that is
designed to analyze the SEC’s enforcement practices and make
recommendations for reform. 206 Although the CHOICE Act (or similar
legislation) may never become law, the attention it has directed to perceived
injustices within the SEC (and other) agency enforcement processes indicates
that the system is inherently at risk.
Agencies are exploring potential solutions. Some currently being
implemented involve amending the SEC’s procedures to more closely mirror
federal court, or increasing scrutiny of how agencies decide which cases to bring
in federal court versus before ALJs. 207 Such changes are not always possible, or
may be insufficient to resolve concerns about the integrity of agency
enforcement proceedings. The addition of a guardian trustee in certain
circumstances could reduce public perception that the agency and the arbiter
are aligned. 208 Both ALJs and litigants alike would benefit from selecting a

202. See Stephen Choi & Adam Prichard, The SEC’s Shift to Administrative Proceedings: An Empirical
Assessment, 34 YALE J. REG. 1, 32 (2017) (“We provide evidence that the complexity of cases, and thus
the cost of litigating cases in administrative proceedings, increased after the enactment of DoddFrank.”).
203. Financial CHOICE Act of 2017, H.R. 10, 115th Cong. (2017) (to be codified in scattered
sections of 10, 12, and 15 U.S.C.); see also Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of U.S.C.).
204. See, e.g., John Crawford, Lesson Unlearned?: Regulatory Reform and Financial Stability in the
Trump Administration, 117 COLUM. L. REV. F. 127, 128 (2017) (discussing provisions of the CHOICE
Act that will “undermine the financial stability of the United States”).
205. Financial CHOICE Act of 2017 § 818. The CHOICE Act makes similar revisions in the
context of CFPB, allowing parties to terminate administrative proceedings and instead require CFPB
to file their claims in federal district court and also making revisions to the process and procedures for
challenging CFPB Civil Investigative Demands. Id. §§ 715–716.
206. Id. § 820.
207. Velikonja, supra note 195, at 319 (outlining changes undertaken by the SEC to address fairness
challenges and to align agency proceedings more closely to those in federal court).
208. The CHOICE Act’s creation of an Enforcement Ombudsman seems to mirror this goal by
providing a neutral, independent entity. See Financial CHOICE Act of 2017 § 818. While the specific
powers and role of the Enforcement Ombudsman are not fully defined, it is described more as a liaison
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guardian trustee from an unrelated, neutral body. 209 ALJs would have the
benefit of hearing objections that the defendant may be hesitant to raise
(especially if the defendant is a regulated entity that will remain subject to the
agency’s authority). Defendants will have the benefit of an additional check on
potential influences that an agency may have over the ALJ. Finally, the agency
itself will benefit from the increased legitimacy and perception of impartiality
that the guardian trustee brings to its proceedings. 210
Another example of agency-related proceedings that may benefit from
additional oversight from a guardian trustee involves quasi-judicial
investigations and enforcement actions under Title IX. 211 Title IX addresses
claims relating to sexual discrimination in federally funded education. 212 The
Department of Education (“ED”) enforces Title IX through its Office for Civil
Rights (“OCR”) division. 213 The ED issued a “Dear Colleague” letter in 2011
that interprets Title IX to require schools to investigate alleged sexual violence
in a particular manner; failure to comply results in the end of federal funding. 214
Scholars highlight that this shift has resulted in the imposition of inquisitionlike trials that remove many fundamental elements of due process,215 as well as
increased scrutiny and investigation of institutions receiving federal funding. 216
between the SEC and parties subject to enforcement actions, rather than a true guardian trustee that
appears and has standing to be heard within the administrative proceeding.
209. To avoid separation-of-powers concerns, the guardian trustee in this context should be
structurally oriented within the executive branch but outside of (or carefully insulated within) the
specific agency that is bringing the enforcement action. See supra Section II.B.
210. A guardian trustee may not be necessary or cost effective to implement in every action;
however, certain categories of cases could automatically qualify. Alternatively, or in addition, the
guardian trustee could be available only upon motion by the defendant or as ordered by the ALJ.
211. Title IX of the Educational Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. 92-318, title IX, § 901, 86 Stat. 373
(1972) (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2018)).
212. See NORMA V. CANTU, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., SEXUAL HARASSMENT GUIDANCE (1997),
https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/sexhar00.html [https://perma.cc/ZZ8R-QWCF].
213. Id.
214. See RUSSLYNN ALI, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., DEAR COLLEAGUE LETTER (2011), http://
www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-201104.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZZ8R-QWCF].
On September 22, 2017, the Acting Assistant Secretary for Civil Rights of the U.S. Department of
Education issued a letter withdrawing the Obama-era Dear Colleague letters referenced herein. See
CANDICE JACKSON, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., DEAR COLLEAGUE LETTER (2017),
https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-title-ix-201709.pdf [cs://perma.cc/ZZ8RQWCF]. It remains uncertain at this time how future proceedings will be impacted by this policy shift
and handled by the ED.
215. See, e.g., Jacob E. Gersen & Jeannie Suk, The Sex Bureaucracy, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 881, 901
(2016) (identifying the bureaucratic regime the ED imposed in sexual assault cases); Jed Rubenfeld,
Privatization and State Action: Do Campus Sexual Assault Hearings Violate Due Process?, 96 TEX. L. REV.
15, 19 (2017) (“[I]n other words, the Special Examiner was simultaneously the investigator, the
prosecutor, and the judge who determined guilt.”).
216. Nathan P. Miller, Dear Colleagues: Examining the Impact of Title IX Regulation,
Investigation, and Public Scrutiny on Higher Education Administrators 103 (2018) (unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pennsylvania), https://search.proquest.com/docview/2099202194
[https://perma.cc/2553-K4KY].
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A guardian trustee could mitigate some of the growing concern relating to this
process, both at the school investigation level for the individual parties, and also
at the enforcement level against schools by navigating the compliance
relationship between the ED and individual institutions. 217 In an evolving legal
environment that faces criticism about process and procedure, adding the
guardian trustee might provide participants with a welcome layer of neutrality
and oversight.
B.

Criminal Proceedings

A guardian trustee could also be designed to address systemic integrity
concerns in certain types of criminal proceedings. Scholars have dedicated their
careers to highlighting the incentive problems and rampant inequalities that lay
at the heart of the criminal justice system. 218 While the addition of an
independent voice cannot possibly solve the persistent and deeply entrenched
challenges of that system, it could provide some benefit in specific instances.
For example, in capital cases, where the stakes are particularly high, a guardian
trustee could ensure that the substantive and procedural protections afforded to
capital defendants are maintained. 219 If implemented correctly, the addition of
a guardian trustee at the trial stage could reduce the number of constitutional
violations that occur and even provide the added benefit of reducing postconviction claims relating to constitutional deficiencies.
Similarly, a guardian trustee could be assigned to oversee the pleabargaining process. Not unlike the settlement context described above, when
the court is presented with a plea bargain it may not be provided with a
complete perspective of the plea’s reasonableness or whether the plea was

217. The Title IX context may pose structural and logistical challenges for implementation of a
guardian trustee. However, each form of guardian trustee can be designed creatively to meet the
specific requirements of the system. In this instance, the potential integrity concerns relate to public
perception of quasi-judicial proceedings addressing alleged sexual assault, as well as agency
enforcement action against educational entities that may be improperly imposed beyond the
jurisdictional boundaries of the agency’s delegated authority. A guardian trustee could be strategically
deployed to address the trial-level concern by fielding and voicing complaints related to procedural
fairness and providing a post-trial summary and evaluation to the OCR. The same guardian trustee
could remain involved in a limited category of agency-level proceedings as the institution is
investigated. Its presence could make sure that the ultimate decisionmaker receives complete
information about the institution’s handling of the incident and compliance with applicable guidelines.
218. See, e.g., Andrew Manuel Crespo, Systemic Facts: Toward Institutional Awareness in Criminal
Courts, 129 HARV. L. REV. 2049, 2051 (2016) (describing shortcomings in the American criminal justice
system from an institutional design perspective).
219. See Jonathan F. Mitchell, Capital Punishment and the Courts, 130 HARV. L. REV. 269, 272
(2017) (identifying procedural and regulatory elements that increase arbitrary and concerning outcomes
in capital cases).
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negotiated fairly. 220 This problem is magnified by the likelihood of
representation and information disparities between the prosecution and the
defense. 221 If a guardian trustee had standing before the court about the
substance or process of a particular plea bargain, the parties would be
incentivized to act reasonably and the court would be given a more complete
set of facts to evaluate.
A guardian trustee may also remedy chronic systemic abuse in the context
of Brady claims addressing prosecutorial misconduct. In Brady v. Maryland, 222
the Supreme Court held that the Constitution requires prosecutors to turn over
material, exculpatory evidence to the defendant prior to trial or sentencing. 223
In the decades since Brady imposed a fundamental disclosure requirement,
scholars and practitioners have consistently highlighted that prosecutors
continue to withhold Brady evidence. 224 One persistent problem involves
identifying and challenging violations. While some jurisdictions have “openfile” discovery standards that allow defendants to know whether the prosecution
disclosed sufficient evidence, in other jurisdictions the only option to challenge
disclosures involves the court reviewing in camera whether a violation
occurred. 225 Defense advocates claim that the existing disclosure and
investigation system is inadequate, and severely disadvantages those seeking to
raise a Brady claim.
Commentators advance a number of potential solutions, including
increased penalties for prosecutors found to have committed Brady violations or
introduction of increased monitoring within the prosecutor’s office. 226 The
problem with such solutions is that there is little evidentiary support for their
220. See Stephanos Bibas, Designing Plea Bargaining from the Ground up: Accuracy and Fairness
Without Trials as Backstops, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1055, 1063–65 (2016) (describing inherent
inaccuracies in guilty pleas).
221. See Erica J. Hashimoto, The Price of Misdemeanor Representation, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV.
461, 475 (2007) (“Lawyers carrying caseloads that far exceed national standards cannot adequately
consult with their clients or provide sufficient investigation.”); L. Song Richardson & Phillip Atiba
Goff, Implicit Racial Bias in Public Defender Triage, 122 YALE L.J. 2626, 2631–32 (2013) (explaining the
impact that limited public defender resources have on representation).
222. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
223. Id. at 87.
224. Miriam H. Baer, Timing Brady, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 4 (2015) (outlining scholarly criticism
of ways in which the Brady doctrine is unclear and does not adequately prevent prosecutorial efforts to
withhold evidence).
225. Id. at 49. But see Ben Grunwald, The Fragile Promise of Open Discovery, 49 CONN. L. REV. 771,
824 (2017) (identifying little beneficial impact in states that implement open-file discovery). Members
of the judiciary have also recognized disclosure challenges in the Brady context and suggest that the
court is in the best position to remedy shortcomings. See United States v. Olsen, 737 F.3d 625, 626
(9th Cir. 2013) (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting) (“There is an epidemic of Brady violations abroad in the
land. Only judges can put a stop to it.”).
226. See, e.g., Jason Kreag, The Brady Colloquy, 67 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 47, 48 n.13 (2014)
(collecting proposed reform ideas). But see Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 54 (2011) (denying civil
liability against prosecutors for failure to train in response to Brady violations).
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effectiveness 227 and they do not, alone, remedy the erosion of public trust in the
process. To date, penalties are not routinely enforced, and increased
prosecutorial monitoring will provide relief only if there is trust that
prosecutors are capable of policing their own behavior. 228 Similarly, in camera
review by the arbiter is effective only to the extent the defense bar has faith in
the adequacy of that review, and the court can be certain that the prosecution
has provided it with all of the critical evidence. 229
Enter the guardian trustee. A neutral watchdog could raise and investigate
Brady claims by reviewing the disputed evidence, collecting information from
both the defense and prosecution, and presenting a summary to the court on
the record. The addition of a guardian trustee in this context reduces the
administrative burden on the court, while also adding a layer of independence
by minimizing the prosecutor’s control over the disclosure process. Most
importantly, a guardian trustee could provide much-needed independent
oversight and increase the prosecutors’ incentives to make sufficient disclosures
upfront, thereby reducing the overall number of Brady violations that
defendants must challenge.
As explored in Part II, guardian trustees benefit from having certain core
characteristics and powers. And while these characteristics and powers are
important to maintain, each form of guardian trustee may require specialized
guidelines so as to fit within the system they are intended to protect. In the
criminal context, for example, the role of the guardian trustee must be designed
in a way that does not influence the jury by giving the impression that its
opinions are the authority on what is “the law,” similar to the arbiter. Juries may
find the addition of a guardian trustee to be confusing, and as a result perhaps
the role of the guardian trustee in criminal cases should be limited. One option
is to permit only a “silent” role in the courtroom, by which the guardian trustee
may submit written objections or motions to the parties and court for

227. See, e.g., Joel B. Rudin, The Supreme Court Assumes Errant Prosecutors Will Be Disciplined by
Their Offices or the Bar: Three Case Studies That Prove That Assumption Wrong, 80 FORDHAM L. REV.
537, 572 (2011) (“Contrary to the Supreme Court’s assumption . . . experience shows that prosecutors
are not disciplined—either internally by their Offices or externally by court or bar disciplinary
committees—for violating their Brady or other due process obligations during criminal proceedings.”);
Ellen Yaroshefsky, Wrongful Convictions: It Is Time To Take Prosecution Discipline Seriously, 8
UDC/DCSL L. REV. 275, 285 (2004) (“All of these reforms and proposals, even if fully implemented
(and funded where necessary) still would not remedy prosecutorial misconduct.”).
228. See Ronald F. Wright & Kay L. Levine, The Cure for Young Prosecutors’ Syndrome, 56 ARIZ. L.
REV. 1065, 1069 (2014) (highlighting the likelihood that inexperienced prosecutors place undue focus
on winning and are more adversarial and uncompromising than more experienced prosecutors, which
may also make them less likely to comply with disclosure obligations).
229. Unfortunately, prosecutors have shown a willingness to withhold information from the court
in addition to the defense. See Report to Court at 3–4, Texas v. Morton, No. 86-452-K26 (D. Tex.
Dec. 19, 2011) (outlining the material evidence that the prosecutor withheld from both the defense and,
more importantly, the trial court during in camera review for a Brady challenge).
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consideration outside of the jury’s presence. The purpose of the guardian
trustee is to alert the parties and arbiter to circumvention of the system’s rules
and procedures, all of which could be established without taking an active role
before the jury.
CONCLUSION
Requiring a guardian trustee to appear in every court proceeding would
be unwanted and superfluous. When there is a risk that the purportedly adverse
parties will take advantage of a system, however, and when the arbiter has
insufficient information or incentive to successfully address such risks, the
guardian trustee can add invaluable protection. The U.S. legal system already
supports entities that are neither parties nor arbiters, including the trustees
described herein and, specifically, the Program. The time has come to
incorporate the guardian trustee concept into a broader discussion of
institutional design tools. Although the guardian trustee may not be superior in
all circumstances, it is a uniquely beneficial device if implemented
appropriately. Designing, deploying, and ultimately embracing the guardian
trustee role in additional contexts will maintain and potentially enhance
stakeholders’ trust in the integrity of at-risk systems.

